In a recent decision, In re Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners, L.P., No. 14-000255-mdc (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2019), the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that state sovereign immunity does not prevent bankruptcy courts from hearing fraudulent transfer claims against states.

On January 13, 2020, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued an opinion in In re La Paloma Generating Company, LLC., Case No. 16-12700 [Adv. Pro.

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari on an issue that has greatly divided Circuit Courts of Appeal – the question of whether an entity that retains possession of a debtor’s property has an affirmative obligation to return that property to the debtor or trustee immediately upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition or risk being in violation of the automatic stay.

The Supreme Court, in Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC,¹ issued an unanimous opinion last week, ruling that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit correctly denied the ability of creditor Ritzen Group Inc.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Delaware bankruptcy court case that held that the mutuality requirement of section 553(a)¹The case declined to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.²

This article first appeared in Corporate Rescue and Insolvency (2019) 6 CRI 218.

In this journal in 2015, I wrote on the subject 'Funding insolvency litigation: a new dawn', outlining various streams of funding available to insolvency practitioners (IPs) (see (2015) 5 CRI 183). Since then, the sun has set on one era and risen again. This article considers key developments in litigation funding in recent years, as well as upcoming reforms which may further change the landscape.

Key Points

A recent bankruptcy court decision out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, In re Verity Health Sys. of Cal., Inc., Case No. 2:18-bk-20151 (ER) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019), is a good reminder of how difficult it is for a purchaser under an asset purchase agreement to get out of the deal by invoking a Material Adverse Effect clause (also known as a Material Adverse Change clause) (an “MAE”).

In a highly anticipated decision issued last Thursday (on December 19, 2019), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC that a bankruptcy court may constitutionally confirm a chapter 11 plan of reorganization that contains nonconsensual third-party releases. The court considered whether, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), Article III of the United States Constitution prohibits a bankruptcy court from granting such releases.

Before ingesting too much holiday cheer, we encourage you to consider a recent opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Weil Bankruptcy Blog connoisseurs will recall that, in May 2019, we wrote on the Southern District of New York’s decision in In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, Case No. 12-2652, 2019 WL 1771786 (S.D.N.Y. April 23, 2019) (Cote, J.) (“Tribune I”).

The High Court decision in Re All Star Leisure (Group) Limited (2019), which confirmed the validity of an administration appointment by a qualified floating charge holder (QFCH) out of court hours by CE-Filing, will be welcomed.

The decision accepted that the rules did not currently provide for such an out of hours appointment to take place but it confirmed it was a defect capable of being cured and, perhaps more importantly, the court also stressed the need for an urgent review of the rules so that there is no doubt such an appointment could be made.