In Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries (In re BFW Liquidation), 899 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that a liability for an allegedly preferential transfer may be reduced by the amount of new value given, regardless of whether that new value has already been repaid by the debtor before its bankruptcy filing.
The current, ultimate dilemma in the health care reimbursement legal arena is the catastrophically long wait for a hearing with an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) with the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (“OMHA”). The estimated wait time for an ALJ hearing after completing the first two levels of appeal is now more than 1,200 days, and the debt being appealed accrues interest at 10.5% the entire time. Moreover, CMS will continue to recoup against new Medicare claims during the three-year wait for a decision-maker that overturns far more decisions than the first two levels.
The South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (the Guaranty) is an unincorporated nonprofit entity created pursuant to the South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the Act). The purpose of the Guaranty is to provide a degree of protection to insureds whose carriers become insolvent. Upon an insurer’s insolvency, the Guaranty assumes the position of the insurer to the extent of the insurer’s obligation relative to covered claim; its liability is derived from that of the insolvent carrier’s liability to the insured.
On June 4, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lamar Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling,[1] resolving a circuit split on the issue of whether a debtor’s statement about a single asset constitutes “a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
Alerts and Updates
The Supreme Court’s opinion is significant because it will encourage creditors to rely on written, rather than oral, statements of debtors as to both their assets and overall financial status, which are better evidence in a nondischargeability case.
In a recent decision out of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia, a court analyzed the effect of a setoff effectuated between two governmental units in the 90 days prior to the filing of a husband and wife’s bankruptcy case. In Hurt v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (In re Hurt), 579 B.R. 765 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2017), the court addressed competing motions for summary judgment filed by the debtors, on the one hand, and the U.S.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit revived a chapter 13 debtor’s bankruptcy case holding that the bankruptcy court below made no specific finding that the debtor violated the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”) to support dismissal of the case.
In one of the first decisions issued this year by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court addressed an issue of first impression. In Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, n/k/a Old Cold LLC, No. 16-9016 (1st Cir. Jan. 12, 2018), the First Circuit held that the omission of trademarks from the definition of “intellectual property” in Section 101(35A) of the Bankruptcy Code, as incorporated by Section 365(n), leaves a trademark licensee with nothing more than a claim for damages upon the rejection of its license under Section 365(a).
On June 8, 2017, Clifford J. White III, director of the U.S. Trustee Program(“UST Program”)[1], proclaimed before a congressional subcommittee that “debtors with assets or income derived from marijuana may not proceed through the bankruptcy system.”
From the Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina :
In McCall v. Anderson Brothers Bank (In re McCall), Adv. Pro. No. 16-80008-jw (Bankr. D.S.C. 2016), the Honorable John E. Waites held that a creditor did not willfully violate the automatic stay under the particular facts of the case where the creditor initially refused to return a vehicle to the Debtor after she filed a Chapter 13 case and demanded the vehicle’s return.