In a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York recently analyzed whether a debtor may exempt from her bankruptcy estate a retirement account that was bequeathed to her upon the death of her parent. In In re Todd, 585 B.R. 297 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y 2018), the court addressed an objection to a debtor’s claim of exemption in an inherited retirement account, and held that the property was not exempt under New York and federal law.

In Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries (In re BFW Liquidation), 899 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that a liability for an allegedly preferential transfer may be reduced by the amount of new value given, regardless of whether that new value has already been repaid by the debtor before its bankruptcy filing.

On June 4, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lamar Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling,[1] resolving a circuit split on the issue of whether a debtor’s statement about a single asset constitutes “a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).

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The Supreme Court’s opinion is significant because it will encourage creditors to rely on written, rather than oral, statements of debtors as to both their assets and overall financial status, which are better evidence in a nondischargeability case.

In a recent decision out of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia, a court analyzed the effect of a setoff effectuated between two governmental units in the 90 days prior to the filing of a husband and wife’s bankruptcy case. In Hurt v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (In re Hurt), 579 B.R. 765 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2017), the court addressed competing motions for summary judgment filed by the debtors, on the one hand, and the U.S.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit revived a chapter 13 debtor’s bankruptcy case holding that the bankruptcy court below made no specific finding that the debtor violated the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”) to support dismissal of the case.

Over the last twenty years, courts have increasingly insulated transactions from avoidance as fraudulent transfers by invoking the so-called “settlement payment” defense codified in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. The safe harbor has been interpreted in the Second and Third Circuits and elsewhere as precluding debtors, trustees and creditors committees from clawing back otherwise objectionable pre-bankruptcy transfers solely because the money at issue flowed through a bank or other financial institution.

In one of the first decisions issued this year by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court addressed an issue of first impression. In Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, n/k/a Old Cold LLC, No. 16-9016 (1st Cir. Jan. 12, 2018), the First Circuit held that the omission of trademarks from the definition of “intellectual property” in Section 101(35A) of the Bankruptcy Code, as incorporated by Section 365(n), leaves a trademark licensee with nothing more than a claim for damages upon the rejection of its license under Section 365(a).

The Tempnology Trademark Saga. When it comes to decisions on bankruptcy and trademark licenses, the In re Tempnology LLC bankruptcy case is the gift that keeps on giving.

Just about every year amendments are made to the rules that govern how bankruptcy cases are managed — the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The amendments address issues identified by an Advisory Committee made up of federal judges, bankruptcy attorneys, and others. As the photo above reminds us, the rule amendments are ultimately adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court (and technically subject to Congressional disapproval).