The Supreme Court of the United States recently addressed whether estate professionals could recover fees expended in defending fee applications. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U.S. _____ (2015). A divided court ruled that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) allowed compensation only for “actual, necessary services rendered[,]” and that to allow fees for defending fee applications would be contrary to the statute and the “American Rule” that each litigant pay her own attorneys’ fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.
The South African Revenue Service (SARS) published Binding Private Ruling No. 198 on 7 July 2015 (Ruling). The Ruling deals with the distribution by a South African resident company (Subsidiary) of its loan account to its South African holding company (Holding Company) in anticipation of the Subsidiary’s deregistration.
The applicable provisions in the Income Tax Act, No 58 of 1962 (Act) are s10(1)(k), s47, s64D and s64FA(1)(b).
The relevant facts relating to the Ruling are as follows:
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has had to interpret ambiguous, imprecise, and otherwise puzzling language in the Bankruptcy Code, including the phrases “claim,” “interest in property,” “ordinary course of business,” “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” “allowed secured claim,” “willful and malicious injury,” “on account of,” “value, as of the effective date of the plan,” “projected disposable income,” “defalcation,” and “retirement funds.” The interpretive principles employed by the Court in interpreting the peculiarities of the Bankruptcy Code were in full view when the Court r
The English High Court in Fondazione Enasarco v Lehman Brothers Finance S.A. and Anthracite Rated Investments (Cayman) Limited [2015] EWHC 1307 (Ch) applied a common sense approach in the circumstances to the determination of Loss under the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement. The judgment of the judge (Mr Justice David Richards) is useful reading for those involved in structured products and derivatives.
Background
On 20 May 2015, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) delivered judgment in the matter of African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers & others(228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69, dealing, amongst other things, decisively with the proper interpretation of the words 'binding offer' as they appear in s153(1)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act, 71 of 2008 (Act).
As parties to litigation, creditors often find themselves in a predicament where the individual they have a claim against has assets of insignificant value. The same individual may, however, be a trustee of a discretionary trust owning substantial assets. Faced with this difficulty, creditors are left with little choice but to ask a court to 'go behind the trust' in an attempt to find assets to execute judgment against.
In two recent cases decided in the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), namely,Willow Waters Homeowners Association (Pty) Limited v KOKA NO and others [2015] JOL 32760 (SCA) and Cowin NO v Kyalami Estate Homeowners Association (499/2013) [2014] ZASCA 221, the SCA was asked to consider:
The in duplum rule is a common law rule that provides that arrear interest ceases to accrue once the sum of the unpaid (accrued) interest equals the amount of capital outstanding at the time (and not the amount of capital originally advanced). "In duplum" directly translates to "double the amount".
An opinion from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Motors Liquidation Company, relying on the Delaware Supreme Court’s answer to a certified question highlight the need to focus on the details w