On April 1, a bevy of dollar amounts set forth in the Bankruptcy Code will change. Some of these are quite important to substantive relief, and others are quite important to making sure you don’t look bad in front of the client or your favorite (least favorite?) judge. We have Section 104 of the Bankruptcy Code to thank for this malpractice-inducing enterprise, which we enjoy every three years. See 11 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (“On April 1, 1998, and at each 3-year interval ending on April 1 thereafter, each dollar amount in effect under sections . . . shall be adjusted . . . .”).
Editor’s Note: Here at The Bankruptcy Cave, we love insolvency stuff; we eat it for breakfast and dream about it at night. (We are not kidding.) Sometimes that includes credit-related litigation, and so we keep our pre-trial, trial, and appellate skills honed. To that end, here is a very helpful cheat sheet we prepared and which we bring with us to every deposition, just in case. (Your author Leah even got to enjoy a no-show deposition in Chicago last year; she created a perfect record using the below.)
In McCann -v- Halpin & anor [2016] IESC 11, the receiver applied to the High Court for directions pursuant to Section 316(1) of the Companies Act 1963, in relation to the exercise of his powers as receiver over the property and assets of Elektron and Crossplan (the Companies). The appeal before the Supreme Court dealt with one issue - whether the receiver was validly appointed.
Facts
In Farrell & Kelly v Petrosyan & Ors (linked to McLoughlin & anor v ACC Loan Management Ltd), High Court, O'Connor J, 2 March 2016 the High Court considered an application for possession on behalf of receivers appointed by ACC Loan Management Limited (ACC). One of the issues before the court was whether the receivers had authority to act in the proceedings in view of their deeds of appointment by ACC.
Including an unsecured creditor in an agreed payments waterfall does not by itself confer on that unsecured creditor the benefit of a mortgagee’s usual duties on enforcement of security, or a direct claim against the sale proceeds.
You may recall the holding and analysis of ASARCO [1]/ from Jay’s previous post, here.
Director of Corporate Enforcement -v- Walsh & ors [2016] IECA 2 concerned an appeal by the Director of Corporate Enforcement (the Director) against a decision of Barrett J declining to make a disqualification or restriction order against three directors.
In Cahill -v- O'Brien & anor [2015] IEHC 817, the Court considered an application for the restriction of two directors pursuant to Section 150 of the Companies Act, 1990 together with an application extending the time for the making of the application.
Facts
In its recent decision in the case of Perfect Pies Limited (in receivership) and Pearse Farrell v Chupn Limited [2015] 11 JIC 0607, the Commercial Court has considered the difficult question of the unreasonable withholding of consent to the assignment of a commercial lease. This case involved interesting issues, in particular around a landlord potentially seeking to use the opportunity of an application for consent to assignment to pursue "ulterior motives" – in this case, to obtain possession of the premises.
Background
Over the summer, four appellate court decisions addressed the doctrine of equitable mootness: In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2015); In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC, No. 13-3410, 2015 WL 4430302 (3d Cir.