1 PGDOCS\6505199.2 2015 Georgia Corporation and Business Organization Case Law Developments Michael P. Carey Bryan Cave LLP Fourteenth Floor 1201 West Peachtree Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30309 (404) 572-6600 March 22, 2016 This paper is not intended as legal advice for any specific person or circumstance, but rather a general treatment of the topics discussed. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author only and not Bryan Cave LLP. The author would like to thank Tom Richey for his continued support, advice and assistance with this paper.
On April 1, a bevy of dollar amounts set forth in the Bankruptcy Code will change. Some of these are quite important to substantive relief, and others are quite important to making sure you don’t look bad in front of the client or your favorite (least favorite?) judge. We have Section 104 of the Bankruptcy Code to thank for this malpractice-inducing enterprise, which we enjoy every three years. See 11 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (“On April 1, 1998, and at each 3-year interval ending on April 1 thereafter, each dollar amount in effect under sections . . . shall be adjusted . . . .”).
Editor’s Note: Here at The Bankruptcy Cave, we love insolvency stuff; we eat it for breakfast and dream about it at night. (We are not kidding.) Sometimes that includes credit-related litigation, and so we keep our pre-trial, trial, and appellate skills honed. To that end, here is a very helpful cheat sheet we prepared and which we bring with us to every deposition, just in case. (Your author Leah even got to enjoy a no-show deposition in Chicago last year; she created a perfect record using the below.)
Including an unsecured creditor in an agreed payments waterfall does not by itself confer on that unsecured creditor the benefit of a mortgagee’s usual duties on enforcement of security, or a direct claim against the sale proceeds.
You may recall the holding and analysis of ASARCO [1]/ from Jay’s previous post, here.
On January 15, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) held in In re Trump Entertainment Resorts that section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to reject an expired collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).
Over the summer, four appellate court decisions addressed the doctrine of equitable mootness: In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2015); In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC, No. 13-3410, 2015 WL 4430302 (3d Cir.
A recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Franklin v. McHugh, 2015 WL 6602023 (2d Cir. 2015), illustrates the dire consequences of failing to comply fully with all electronic filing requirements for a notice of appeal.
In Quadrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. v. Vertin (Oct. 20, 2015), the Delaware Court of Chancery, in a post-trial decision, rejected Quadrant’s challenges to transactions by Athilon Capital Corp., with Athilon’s sole stockholder (private equity firm Merced), after Athilon had returned to solvency following a long period of insolvency. Merced held all of Athilon’s equity and all of its junior notes; and both Quadrant and Merced held the company’s publicly traded senior notes.
In a recent bankruptcy case, Richard Lewiston unsuccessfully attempted to shelter his assets in the Lois and Richard Lewiston Living Trust (the “Trust”) from inclusion in his bankruptcy estate based on the Trust’s spendthrift provision. Here, the bankruptcy court looked to Michigan state law in applying the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and concluded the Trust property was part of Lewiston’s bankruptcy estate.
Facts about the Trust: