Lender's Security Interest in Funds Lost Upon Transfer to Debtor's Counsel
Addressing a circuit split over a trademark licensee’s rights following a debtor/licensor’s bankruptcy, the US Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) for the First Circuit held that, although trademarks and trade names are not included in bankruptcy law’s definition of “intellectual property,” the licensee’s rights to use the licensor’s trademarks as set forth in the agreement were not terminated by the debtor’s rejection of the agreement. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology LLC, Case No. 15-065 (BAP, 1st Cir., 2016) (Hoffman, J).
Imagine that while a bankruptcy case is pending, the debtor-in-possession or bankruptcy trustee files a state law claim against one of the estate's creditors. Presumably, if the debtor wins its state law claim, that recovery augments the bankruptcy estate and increases the amount available to pay the debtor's creditors.[1] The creditor, seeking to avoid litigating the action in the debtor's home state court, timely removes the lawsuit to federal court as permitted under 28 U.S.C.
In an order issued today, Judge Dalton of the Middle District of Florida held that in a non-bankruptcy context, allegations that collection of a mortgage debt is barred by the statute of limitations do not form a “plausible basis” for claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, or the Declaratory Judgment Act.
On November 21, 2016, in a case entitled In re Monson,1 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision,2 which held that a debtor's conduct constituted a willful and malicious injury to a creditor within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), because the debtor injured the creditor's right to recover its loan, the injury was intended, and the debtor was conscious of his wrongdoing. Thus, the debt was nondischargeable under 523(a)(6).
Exceptions to the Dischargeability of Debt under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code
“Top hat plans” have many attractive features, but a new court decision is a reminder that top hat plan participants have limited protections under ERISA – and that assets held in a rabbi trust are not protected from the claims of creditors upon the employer’s bankruptcy or insolvency.
December 2 marks the 15th anniversary of the Enron bankruptcy—a near cataclysmic event that ultimately led to a series of significant legislative, regulatory and public policy developments that inform governance practices to this day. The entire board would be well served by a brief overview of the governance impact of Enron, particularly since many directors were not in board service 15 years ago.
The Bankruptcy Code gives a trustee the power to avoid pre-petition fraudulent and preference transfers made by a debtor, except that a trustee may not avoid a transfer that is "made by or to (or for the benefit of)" a party enumerated in 546(e) of the Code "in connection with a securities contract." Although 546(e) has been applied in various circumstances, there is little court guidance on whether 546(e) protects transfers made to repay commercial mortgage-backed securities ("CMBS") loans. One case in particular has applied 546(e) to dismiss such an avoidance action: Krol v.
Burr & Forman lawyers won a significant victory in the Eleventh Circuit earlier this month. In the case In re: David A. Failla, — F.3d — (2016), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that a person who agrees to “surrender” his house in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) may not oppose the creditor’s foreclosure action in state court. Our firm was one of the first to advance this argument, and many, but not all, of the bankruptcy judges in Florida agreed with our interpretation of surrender under the bankruptcy code and related case law.
On October 11, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States granted cert in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, No. 16-348 (Oct. Term 2016) to resolve a split among the Circuits as to the FDCPA’s prohibition against deceptive collection practices in the context of filing proofs of claim for debts where a collection action would otherwise be time-barred.