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On Oct. 27, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that even inadvertent mistakes in UCC filings count – the burden rests on the filing party to detect errors, and not on affected parties who come across them in a search. This ruling upsets the 2013 decision of the bankruptcy court and will ultimately determine the character of a $1.5 billion security interest in the General Motors (GM) bankruptcy.

Background

Judgment by Cregan J of 6 October 2014

Overview

This case concerned an application by the official liquidator of RQB Limited (in liquidation) (the Company) pursuant to S280 of Companies Act 1963 to determine the legal status of a floating charge dated 10 September 2008 which entered into by the Company in favour of Danske Bank (the Bank) and which the liquidator believes to be unenforceable.

Background

The "2005 Facility"

As bankruptcy practitioners will recall, the Supreme Court held in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) that bankruptcy courts, as non-Article III courts, “lack[] the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim,” even though Congress had classified these types of proceedings as core – and thus authorized federal bankruptcy courts to hear and decide them.

In 2014, the Chilean Legislature enacted legislation that substantially overhauls its prior insolvency law, liberalizing that law as it pertains to business insolvency cases commenced in Chile. As explained below, this new law incorporates a number of provisions that permit the reorganization of financially troubled businesses.

A lingering misperception among American businesspersons and some commercial lawyers is that it is a fool’s errand to commence an insolvency case seeking reorganization in a European nation because those national laws prescribe liquidation rather than rehabilitation. These business leaders often dismiss out-of-hand insolvency relief on the continent for a troubled European subsidiary and elect to wind up the company’s affairs outside the judicial system.

The Court of Appeal delivered judgment on Monday morning in the much anticipated appeal in Jervis & Others v Pillar Denton & Others on the treatment of rent payable under a lease held by a corporate tenant that enters administration. The case involved the Game Administration.

Last week the Court of Appeal finished hearing the long awaited and much anticipated appeal in Jervis and another v Pillar Denton Limited (Game Station) on the hotly contested issue of whether rent is payable as an administration expense. Depending on the decision of the appeal judges this case may trigger a dramatic shift in the way that rent arising during administration is currently treated.

Background 

In the matter of Fuerta Limited, High Court, 22 January 2014

Judge: Mr. Justice Charleton

A recent decision of the High Court has highlighted the interesting area of law that applies when an application is made to wind up a company on the grounds that it is "just and equitable" to do so.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently limited the ability of a secured creditor to credit bid for substantially all of the debtors’ assets because (i) the credit bid would chill, or even freeze, the bidding process, (ii) the proposed expedited private sale pursuant to a credit bid would be inconsistent with notions of fairness in the bankruptcy process, and (iii) the amount of the secured claim was uncertain. In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., Case No. 13-13087 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014).

Section 1111(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) is one of its least understood provisions, primarily due to its somewhat opaque language. This Code subsection is divided into two distinct but related parts. The first part, section 1111(b)(1), provides that a nonrecourse secured claim in a Chapter 11 case will be treated “as if such holder had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not such holder has such recourse” subject to two exceptions.