Affirmative action measures were introduced in South Africa to reconcile the injustices of the past. Although policies have been implemented for the achievement of equality for persons previously disadvantaged, at what point do these policies unjustifiably infringe the rights of persons affected by them?

On Jan. 17, 2017, in a closely watched dispute surrounding Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp. (the “Decision”).[1] In a 2-1 ruling reversing the District Court,[2] the Court of Appeals construed Section 316(b) narrowly, holding that it only prohibits “non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms” and does not protect noteholders’ practical ability to receive payment.[3]

“Transaction fees are part of the standard, negotiated base compensation for the investment banker,” held the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on Dec. 16, 2016. In re Relativity Fashion, LLC, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4339, *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2016) (Wiles, B.J.). The court denied objections to the transaction fees sought by two investment bankers, P and H, ruling that the objecting parties (a fee examiner, the debtor and a secured lender) had no right under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 328(a) to challenge the transaction fees. Id. at *25.

An undersecured mortgagee’s “release of [its entire underlying claim] was value obtained ‘in exchange for’ the [pre-bankruptcy] sale of the [debtor’s] property,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on Dec. 6, 2016. In re Expert South Tulsa LLC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21704, at *11 (10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2016). The Tenth Circuit flatly rejected the debtor’s attempt “to set aside as a fraudulent transfer its own sale of real estate that was encumbered by a mortgage far exceeding the sale price.” Id. at *1.

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

“Any ... suit [against creditors’ committee members for their official acts] must be brought in the bankruptcy court, or in another court only with the express permission of the bankruptcy court,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 28, 2016. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club LLC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21187, *9 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2016).

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

“[T]he bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying [the debtor’s former employees’] motion to compel arbitration” when the dispute turned on the relative priority of their claims, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Oct. 6, 2016. In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 2016 WL 5853265, *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 6, 2016). The Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”) trustee in the liquidation of Lehman Brothers Inc.

“Equitable mootness” prevented the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit from “unravel[ing] the entire Plan, … forc[ing] the City [Detroit] back into emergency oversight, and requir[ing] a wholesale recreation of the vast and complex web of negotiated settlements and agreements.” In re City of Detroit, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17774, *14, *17 (6th Cir. Oct. 3, 2016) (2-1).

Sometimes different bits of legislation are, on the face of it, in conflict with each other. This is specially so when new law is introduced. The impact of new law on old law sets up contradictions, which the courts have to sort out. An interesting recent example arose in the context of business rescue.

The issue in this case was whether a payment of R389 593.49 by Ditona – a company being wound-up – to another company Eravin, was recoverable by Ditona’s liquidators as a void disposition or unrecoverable because, it was a pre-business rescue debt, which may not be enforced.