“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

A defendant bank (“Bank”) in a fraudulent transfer suit “could not prove” its “good faith” defense for loan repayments it received after its “investigator discovered [the] fraudulent past” of the Ponzi scheme debtor’s principal but “failed to disclose that past to [the Bank’s account] manager,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on Feb. 8, 2017. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2248, *28 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2017).

The Court of Appeal has recently overturned the commonly held belief that a validation order would normally be made if the disposition made by a company subject to a winding up petition was done so in good faith and in the ordinary course of business at a time when the parties were unaware of the existence of the petition.

1. The starting point

Section 127 Insolvency Act 1986 provides:

On Jan. 17, 2017, in a closely watched dispute surrounding Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp. (the “Decision”).[1] In a 2-1 ruling reversing the District Court,[2] the Court of Appeals construed Section 316(b) narrowly, holding that it only prohibits “non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms” and does not protect noteholders’ practical ability to receive payment.[3]

“Transaction fees are part of the standard, negotiated base compensation for the investment banker,” held the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on Dec. 16, 2016. In re Relativity Fashion, LLC, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4339, *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2016) (Wiles, B.J.). The court denied objections to the transaction fees sought by two investment bankers, P and H, ruling that the objecting parties (a fee examiner, the debtor and a secured lender) had no right under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 328(a) to challenge the transaction fees. Id. at *25.

An undersecured mortgagee’s “release of [its entire underlying claim] was value obtained ‘in exchange for’ the [pre-bankruptcy] sale of the [debtor’s] property,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on Dec. 6, 2016. In re Expert South Tulsa LLC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21704, at *11 (10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2016). The Tenth Circuit flatly rejected the debtor’s attempt “to set aside as a fraudulent transfer its own sale of real estate that was encumbered by a mortgage far exceeding the sale price.” Id. at *1.

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

“Any ... suit [against creditors’ committee members for their official acts] must be brought in the bankruptcy court, or in another court only with the express permission of the bankruptcy court,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 28, 2016. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club LLC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21187, *9 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2016).

RBS announced last month that SME customers will automatically be entitled to a refund of the fees that they were charged whilst being managed by the Bank’s Global Restructuring Group (GRG) between 2008 and 2013 following a review by the FCA.

This offer follows on from the payments RBS has made in recent years for the mis-selling of PPI and interest rate swap products which has resulted in £1.8 billion of redress costs.

This article examines possible consequences for SMEs that were in GRG during the relevant period which now are, or have been, in an insolvency procedure.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).