The default setting for the hearing of many contested debt recovery and security enforcement cases is by way of affidavit evidence, particularly in the High Court[1]. The creditor swears an affidavit setting out the reasons why it maintains the court should rule in its favour. Certain documents can be presented as exhibits that back up its case such as a contract.

It is now well documented that many owners’ management companies are facing the prospect of litigating to recover the cost of remedial works for defective developments or passing the cost onto the owners themselves. Given the passage of time since the construction of the developments and the insolvency of many of the developers and contractors involved in those projects following the financial crisis, management companies often face an uphill battle to recover damages.

The appointment of a receiver by way of equitable execution has generally been considered a “remedy of last resort”[1] and, for over a hundred years, courts have expressed differing views as to when they could appoint such a receiver.

On May 20, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling of key significance for trademark licensing and for acquisitions, investments, financings and other transactions in which trademark licenses are a key value driver. In Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,[1] the Court held, 8-1, that where the licensor of a trademark rejects a trademark license in bankruptcy, the rejection does not deprive the licensee of its rights to use the licensed trademark(s).

A bankruptcy court decision recently detailed how courts applying Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 303(i) can sanction creditors who “abuse… the power given to [them]… to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition.” In re Anmuth Holdings LLC, 2019 WL 1421169, * 1 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019).

A bankruptcy trustee was “not entitled to avoid” a secured lender’s “lien under the Bankruptcy Code” (“Code”), held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Sept. 11, 2019. In re 180 Equipment, LLC, 2019 WL 4296751, *6 (7th Cir. Sept. 11, 2019). The court rejected the trustee’s argument that the lender’s “lien [was] avoidable because the [lender’s] financing statement failed to properly indicate the secured collateral.” Id., at 1.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on April 23, 2019, denied the litigation trustee’s motion for leave to file a sixth amended complaint that would have asserted constructive fraudulent transfer claims against 5,000 Tribune Company (“Tribune”) shareholders. In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, 2019 WL 1771786 (S.D.N.Y. April 23, 2019). The safe harbor of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 546(e) barred the trustee’s proposed claims, held the court. Id., at * 12.

Bankruptcy law has always sought to strike a balance between the rights of creditors and debtors. In Ireland, bankruptcy and personal insolvency law has incurred seismic change over the past decade. Many of the legislative changes have been implemented from a policy basis of assisting the debtor. We look at recent developments, from the point of view of the petitioning creditor in any bankruptcy.

Automatic discharge from bankruptcy

The Land and Conveyancing Law Reform (Amendment) Bill 2019 (the “Bill”) proposes to broaden the factors that the courts can consider in refusing orders for possession sought by lenders.

The Bill has its roots in the Keeping People in their Homes Bill, 2018, introduced by Kevin “Boxer” Moran T.D., as a private member’s bill. However, the Bill does not go as far as Mr Moran’s bill and, for instance, does not require disclosure of the price paid by a purchaser of the loan.

Background

The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) permits “a creditor [to] assert an unsecured claim for post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees based on a pre-[bankruptcy] promissory note,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on Feb. 8, 2019. SummitBridge Nat’l Investments III, LLC v. Faison, 2019 WL 490573, *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 8, 2019). In a sensible opinion, the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower courts’ disallowance of an undersecured lender’s claim for legal fees. The court thus “join[ed] other federal courts of appeals” with its holding. Id.