In 7636156 Canada Inc. v. OMERS Realty Corporation1 (“7636156 v. OMERS”), the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”) held that a bankrupt’s landlord was only entitled to have drawn down on a letter of credit by an amount equal to the landlord’s priority claim for three months’ accelerated rent, rather than by the full amount of the letter of credit, and ordered that the landlord pay over the excess to the bankrupt’s trustee.
A creditor’s “later-in-time reclamation demand is ‘subject to’ [a lender’s] prior rights as a secured creditor,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Feb. 11, 2020. In re HHGregg, Inc., 2020 WL 628268 (7th Cir. Feb. 11, 2020). And “[w]hen a lender insists on collateral, it expects the collateral to be worth something,” said the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on Feb. 11, 2020, when rejecting a guarantor’s “novel reading” of his security agreement. In re Somerset Regional Water Resources, LLC, 2020 WL 628542 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 2020).
Lender repossesses the equipment of its business borrower after it defaults on its secured loan agreement. Because borrower needs the equipment to run its business, it then files a Chapter 11 petition and promptly asks lender to return the equipment. Lender refuses because the equipment secures the defaulted loan. Depending on where the debtor sought bankruptcy relief (e.g., New York or New Jersey), lender may be subject to sanctions for holding on to the equipment.
A bankruptcy trustee may sell “avoidance powers to a self-interested party that will abandon those claims, so long as the overall value obtained for the transfer is appropriate,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Jan. 15, 2020. Silverman v. Birdsell, 2020 WL 236777, *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 2020).
A secured lender’s “mere retention of property [after a pre-bankruptcy–repossession] does not violate” the automatic stay provision [§ 362(a)(3)] of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”), held a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court on Jan. 14, 2021. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 2021 WL 125106, *4 (Jan. 14,2021). Reversing the Seventh Circuit’s affirmance of a bankruptcy court judgment holding a secured lender in contempt for violating the automatic stay, the Court resolved “a split” in the Circuits. Id., at *2. The Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits had agreed with the Seventh Circuit.
“[A] secured creditor [has no] affirmative obligation under the automatic stay to return a debtor’s [repossessed] collateral to the bankruptcy estate immediately upon notice of the debtor’s bankruptcy,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on Oct. 28, 2019. In re Denby-Peterson, 2019 WL 5538570, 1 (3d Cir. Oct. 28, 2019). Affirming the lower courts, the Third Circuit joined “the minority of our sister courts — the Tenth and D.C. Circuits” with its holding.
On December 3, 2019, the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) released its decision in 1732427 Ontario Inc. v. 1787930 Ontario Inc.1 At issue was a pre-authorized debit payment processed by a supplier after a debtor filed a notice of intention to file a proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”). The motion judge had found this payment to be an exercise of a creditor remedy prohibited by the stay provisions of subsection 69(1) of the BIA.
A bankruptcy court’s preliminary injunction was “not a final and immediately appealable order,” held the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware on Dec. 10, 2019. In re Alcor Energy, LLC
On November 14, 2019, the Alberta Court of Appeal (the “ABCA”) released its decision in PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. v. 1905393 Alberta Ltd. (“1905393 Alberta”),1 dismissing an appeal of an approval and vesting order made in the context of a receivership proceeding.
An insolvent parent’s college “tuition payments… depleted the [debtor’s] estate and furnished nothing of direct value to the [debtor’s] creditors…,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on Nov. 12, 2019. In re Palladino, 2019 WL 5883721, *3 (1st Cir. Nov. 12, 2019). Reversing the bankruptcy court on a direct appeal, the First Circuit rejected its reasoning “that a financially self-sufficient daughter offered [the debtor parents] an economic benefit.” Id. at *2.