La Sentencia 3019/2017 de la Sala de lo Civil del Tribunal Supremo, de 18 de julio de 2017 aclara que los administradores sociales, tanto los de derecho, como los de hecho, serán responsables solidarios por las deudas contraídas por la sociedad como consecuencia de un despido, declarado improcedente después del acaecimiento de una causa de disolución.

La Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado, en su Resolución de 14 de junio de 2017, ha desestimado el recurso interpuesto contra la negativa del Registrador Mercantil de Burgos a inscribir una escritura de nombramiento y cese de administradores. El motivo de la negativa reside en la previa disolución de pleno derecho de la sociedad en virtud de la Disposición Transitoria Primera de la Ley 2/2007, 15 de marzo, de Sociedades Profesionales.

InIn Re Lexington Hospitality Group, LLC, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky thwarted a lender’s efforts to control whether its borrower could file bankruptcy. As a condition to the loan, the lender mandated that the borrower’s operating agreement have certain provisions that require the affirmative vote of an “Independent Manager” and 75% of the members to authorize a bankruptcy.

The Delaware bankruptcy court recently decided that a debtor could not assign a trademark license absent the consent of the licensor. The court concluded that federal trademark law and the terms of the license precluded assignment without consent. Because the debtor could not assign the license under any circumstances (consent was not forthcoming), the court held that cause existed to annul the automatic stay to permit the licensor to “move on with its trademark and its business.”

El Tribunal Supremo reitera, en su sentencia de 5 de mayo de 2017, su doctrina relativa a la acción individual de responsabilidad de los administradores y la necesidad de que además de probarse el daño se demuestre la existencia de una conducta del administrador, ilegal o carente de la diligencia de un ordenador empresario, así como la existencia del nexo causal entre la conducta y el daño.

Exculpation provisions in operating agreements must be carefully crafted in order to protect members, managers, directors and officers for breaches of fiduciary duties. In In re Simplexity, LLC, the Chapter 7 trustee sued the former officers and directors (who were also members and/or managers) for failing to act to preserve going concern value and exposing the debtors to WARN Act claims. The defendants argued the exculpation language in the operating agreements shielded against breach of fiduciary duty liability.

It is very common for bankruptcy court orders to provide that the court retains jurisdiction to enforce such orders. Similarly, chapter 11 confirmation orders routinely provide that the bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction over all orders previously entered in the case. The enforceability of these “retention of jurisdiction” provisions, however, will not rest on the plain language in the order but on the bankruptcy court’s statutory jurisdiction.

Earlier this month, the Supreme Court announced that it will review the scope of Bankruptcy Code section 546(e)’s safe harbor provision. Section 546(e) protects from avoidance those transfers that are made “by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution, except where there is actual fraud. The safe harbor is intended to ensure the stability of the securities market in the event of corporate restructurings.

As noted in a recent Distressing Matters post, the United States Supreme Court in In re Jevic Holding Corp. held that debtors cannot use structured dismissals to make payments to creditors in violation of ordinary bankruptcy distribution priority rules.

El Tribunal Supremo desestima, en su sentencia de 13 de marzo de 2017, el recurso de casación presentado por una sociedad en concurso de acreedores que pretendía el pago por parte de una sociedad a la que había transmitido ciertos activos durante el concurso, de la cantidad que se acordó retener por las partes en concepto de gastos a cargo del vendedor, argumentando que no se admite en sede de concurso la compensación de créditos (ex. art. 58 LC, que proscribe la compensación de los créditos concursales).