In Beijing Tong Gang Da Sheng Trade Co., Ltd (as assignee of Greater Beijing Region Expressways Limited) v Allen & Overy & Anor, FACV 2, 3, 4 and 5 of 2016, the Court of Final Appeal held that the addition or substitution of a party to an action amounts to a “new claim”, as defined in section 35(2) of the Limitation Ordinance (Cap 347)) and would not therefore be permitted after the relevant limitation period had expired, unless it came within the rules of court as required under Section 35(3) and (5) of the Limitation Ordinance (Cap 347).

One of the most powerful and oft used devices in bankruptcy is the sale of assets “free and clear” of liens, claims and interests. One issue a buyer at a bankruptcy sale must consider, however, is whether due process has been met with respect to parties whose liens, claims and/or interests are released through such sale. Indeed, a lack of due process could foil a “free and clear” sale, leaving a buyer with an encumbered purchase and nowhere to turn for recourse.

There are numerous reasons why a company might use more than one entity for its operations or organization: to silo liabilities, for tax advantages, to accommodate a lender, or for general organizational purposes. Simply forming a separate entity, however, is not enough. Corporate formalities must be followed or a court could effectively collapse the separate entities into one. A recent opinion by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, Lassman v.

This is the third in a series of articles highlighting the changes to be brought in by the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Amendment) Ordinance 2016 (Amendment Ordinance). Since our last article, 13 February 2017 has been announced as the date when the Amendment Ordinance will come into effect. The Amendment Ordinance makes amendments to the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (CWUMPO) and the Companies (Winding Up) Rules (CWUR).

The linked Mintz Levin client advisory discusses a recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that held a “make-whole” optional redemption premium to be due upon a refinancing of corporate debt following its automatic acceleration upon bankruptcy.

In a recent decision (“Energy Future Holdings”) poised to have wide-reaching implications, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decisions of the Bankruptcy and the District Courts to hold that a debtor cannot use a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing to escape liability for a “make-whole” premium if express contractual language requires such payment when the borrower makes an optional redemption prior to a date certain.

In Re Hin-Pro International Logistics Ltd, CACV 54/2016, the Court of Appeal upheld the Court of First Instance (CFI) decision that the courtdoes have jurisdiction to grant leave to amend a creditor’s winding-up petition, to include debts accruedafter its presentation. The company had been granted leave to appeal the CFI decision to enable the Court of Appeal to consider whether the rule in Eshelby v Federated European Bank Ltd [1932] 1 KB 254 (the Eshelby Rule), still applied.

This is the second in a series of articles highlighting the changes to be brought in by the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Amendment) Ordinance 2016 (Amendment Ordinance), which was gazetted on 3 June 2016 and will come into effect on a date to be appointed by the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury.

Imagine you are the CEO of company sitting across from an interviewer. The interviewer asks you the age old question, “So tell me about your company’s strengths and weaknesses?” You start thinking about your competitive advantages that distinguish you from competitors. You decide to talk about how you know your customers better than the competition, including who they are, what they need, and how your products and services fit their needs and desires. The interviewer, being somewhat cynical, asks “Aren’t you worried about the liabilities involved with collecting all that data?”

A recent opinion issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reminds us that corporate veil-piercing liability is not exclusive to shareholders. Anyone who is in control of and misuses the corporate structure can be found liable for the obligations of the corporation. The facts of this case, however, did not support personal liability for veil-piecing.