On August 23, 2019, President Trump signed into law the “Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019.” The primary effect of the “SBRA” is the creation of a subchapter to Chapter 11 for small business debtors, i.e. those with no more than $2,725,625 in secured and unsecured debts combined, to address the unique issues faced by those companies in the bankruptcy process.

Transfers and transactions up to ten years old may be scrutinized, unwound and recovered by a trustee, the bankruptcy court sitting in Massachusetts recently held in the NECCO (think chalky wafer candy) bankruptcy case. The ruling, in a case of first impression in Massachusetts, expands the reach back period from the typical four-year period for fraudulent transfer recovery, so long as the IRS is a creditor in the case.

In determining the legal standard for holding a creditor in civil contempt for attempting to collect a debt in violation of a bankruptcy discharge order, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted an “objectively reasonable” standard, and held that a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt if there is “no fair ground of doubt” as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, which had applied a subjective standard for civil contempt.

This past May, in a highly-anticipated decision, the Supreme Court held in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC that a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code has the same effect as a breach of contract outside of bankruptcy.

Over the last two years, much of the healthcare world has been watching the government’s prosecution of Insys Therapeutics for its sales and marketing practices related to its Subsys spray. Subsys is powerful and highly addictive fentanyl spray (administered under the tongue) that was approved by the FDA in 2012 for the treatment of persistent breakthrough pain in adult cancer patients who were already receiving, and tolerant to, regular opioid therapy.

On May 20, 2019, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a debtor-licensor’s ‘rejection’ of a trademark license agreement under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code does not terminate the licensee’s rights to continue to use the trademark. The decision, issued in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, resolved a split among the Circuits, but may spawn additional issues regarding non-debtor contractual rights in bankruptcy.

The Court Tells Debtors, “No Take Backs”

In an agricultural lien contest between three creditors of a bankrupt commercial farm, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of a bank that provided debtor-in-possession financing, holding that the locale of the farm products determined the applicable lien law and that bank’s lien was superior to the liens of two nurseries that supplied trees and shrubs because the latter were either unperfected or unenforceable.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a lower bankruptcy court’s ruling that a refinanced mortgage was enforceable as to the interests of both husband and wife, where the wife did not execute the note and was not defined as a “borrower” in the body of the mortgage, but nonetheless initialed and signed the mortgage document as a “borrower” in the signature block.

The Supreme Court of Missouri recently held that a trial court abused its discretion by certifying an overly broad class with a class representative whose claims against the debt collector defendant were not typical of the class.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a recent change to Ohio law involving notice of a defective lien had no bearing on a bankruptcy trustee’s ability to avoid the defective lien because such notice is irrelevant to a trustee’s status as a judicial lien creditor.

Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s upholding of the bankruptcy court’s denial of the mortgagee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.