Foreclosure defense and bankruptcy often go hand in hand, but sometimes it seems like the left hand doesn’t talk to the right. This has proven especially common with bankruptcy plans that propose to “surrender” real property encumbered by a mortgage. The term “surrender” is not defined in the bankruptcy code. As a result, lenders and borrowers often interpret the term differently. For example, most lenders interpret surrender to mean not defending a foreclosure.

The Issue and Background

On June 1, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, in which all nine Justices joined in an opinion that reversed an Eleventh Circuit ruling that chapter 7 debtors may “strip off” wholly unsecured junior liens. The Caulkett opinion largely relies upon the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), in which the Court held that a chapter 7 debtor may not “strip down” liens where the value of the property partially secures the underlying claim.

Currently before the Supreme Court is Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO, L.L.C.,2 in which the Court will determine whether bankruptcy judges have discretion to award compensation for the defense of a fee application under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a). The decision in Baker Botts will likely resolve a circuit split and make clear whether a defense of a fee application is necessary to the administration of the case and, therefore, compensable.

A recent court ruling highlights the need for robust governance practices for nonprofits, particularly those facing financial difficulties.  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a jury’s award of $2.25 million in compensatory damages against former directors and officers of a bankrupt nonprofit corporation - personal liability for breach of fiduciary duties and “deepening insolvency.”¹  The court also affirmed punitive damages against the officer defendants, but vacated the award of punitive damages against the director defendants.

Following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision last year in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the filing of a proof of claim on a time-barred debt in a bankruptcy case pending in the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (“FDCPA”). But as the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama recently made clear in Gurganus v. Recovery Management Systems Corp. (In re Gurganus), No. 7:14-ap-70054-BGC, 2015 WL 65089 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has agreed to hear Bullard v. Hyde Park Savings Bank (In re Bullard), U.S., No. 14-116 (cert. granted 12/12/14). The Court's decision in this case will resolve a circuit split with regard to whether an order denying confirmation of a bankruptcy plan is a final order appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). The decision has the potential to impact Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 cases.

Section 1322(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code1 allows debtors to cure defaults and reinstate a 
mortgage on their principal residence "until such residence is sold at a foreclosure sale that is 
conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law."2
 Like many provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, this one appears fairly straightforward at first glance; a debtor has the right to 
cure and reinstate a home mortgage until the property is sold at a foreclosure sale. 

On Monday, November 17, 2014, the United States Supreme Court agreed to decide a critical issue for mortgage lenders and secondary market investors, whether Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a Chapter 7 debtor to “strip off” a junior mortgage lien when the outstanding senior debt exceeds the current value of the senior lien.  Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, No. 13-1421, 2014 WL 2207208 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2014); Bank of America, N.A. v. Toledo-Cardona, No. 14-163, 2014 WL 3965212 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2014). 

Contexte

En février 2012, la fermeture des hauts fourneaux de Florange divise la classe politique. Le président François Hollande s’engage alors à ce que désormais tout société voulant mettre fin à son activité en France soit soumise à l’obligation de rechercher un repreneur.