The Recast Insolvency Regulation (Regulation 2015/848) (“Recast Regulation”) will apply to all member states of the EU (with the exception of Denmark) in relation to insolvency proceedings opened on or after 26 June 2017. The Recast Regulation takes a similar approach to that of the prior EU Insolvency Regulation (Regulation 1346/2000), which came into force in 2002. The Recast Regulation seeks to create a uniform code for insolvency jurisdiction, and cross-border recognition (within the acceding Member States).

Intercreditor agreements between multiple lenders are part and parcel of lending to a company with several tranches of debt. Under section 510 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”), “[a] subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (West 2017).

The sole shareholder of several closely held corporate entities engages in a fraudulent transfer by extinguishing one entity’s right to payment from a third party in exchange for the release of liabilities owed by other entities to that same third party. In Motorworld, Inc. v. William Benkendorf, et al., __ N.J. __ (Mar. 30, 2017), the New Jersey Supreme Court voided such a transfer against a Chapter 7 debtor corporation whose sole asset was a $600,000 loan receivable purportedly cancelled by the release.

In a judgment that will undoubtedly impact what has become fairly common practice when filing notices of intention to appoint an administrator (“NOITA”), the Court of Appeal has held in JCAM Commercial Real Estate Property XV Ltd v Davis Haulage Ltd[1] that a company seeking to give notice of intention to appoint under paragraph 26 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “Act”), and to file a copy o

The Insolvency Rules 2016 (the 2016 Rules) have effect from 6 April 2016. A key change introduced by the 2016 Rules is a new approach to decision making, including a deemed consent procedure. The new approach is designed to ease the administrative and cost burden in insolvency proceedings, and is summarised below.

Deemed consent

The Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated ruling in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. ___ (2017)1 on March 21, reversing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ affirmance of an order approving the distribution of the proceeds of settlement of bankruptcy estate causes of action to general unsecured creditors via structured dismissal, with no distribution to holders of priority wage claims.

The Court framed the question presented, and its ruling, very narrowly—twice. First:

The UK Court of Appeal recently considered the liability of issuers to secondary market investors under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 (the “1967 Act”) in the case of Taberna Europe CDO II Plc v Selskabet (formerly Roskilde Bank A/S) (In bankruptcy) [2016] EWCA Civ 1262. The Court found that primary and secondary investors could potentially be entitled to rely on online content, such as product presentations, which have been published in a deliberate manner, particularly if the issuer directs investors to the content.

On 6 April 2017, together with the new Insolvency Rules (England and Wales) 2016, the Investment Bank (Amendment of Definition) and Special Administration (Amendment) Regulations 2017 (the “Regulations”) will come into force.

These regulations follow an independent review of the special administration regime, undertaken by Peter Bloxham during 2013, assessing the success of the special administration regime and making recommendations of possible changes that may improve the operation and robustness of the regime.

The Southern District of New York upheld a very closely watched decision of recent years affecting bankruptcies in the oil and gas industry.

In a very recent decision, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that a negative inference to an exception to a negative covenant prevented a company from undertaking a proposed restructuring transaction. We find the case unique not because of the result necessarily, but rather because the court used the negative inference to override another express provision in the Credit Agreement.