The decision provides some additional, though limited protection for licensees of trademarks in bankruptcy proceedings

Introduction

In In re Tempnology LLC,1 the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (the BAP) for the First Circuit provided additional clarity regarding the rights of intellectual property licensees under section 365(n) of the United States Bankruptcy Code,2 particularly with respect to trademark licenses. In Tempnology, the First Circuit BAP concluded that:

Section 365(n) extends only to licenses of "intellectual property" as defined in the Bankruptcy Code,3

With a new Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code that has become effective on 1 December 2016, India seeks to expedite the process for creditors seeking payment or foreclosure through the courts.

Il Decreto Legge n. 59/2016 (il cosiddetto “Decreto Banche”, di seguito il Decreto) è stato pubblicato in Gazzetta Ufficiale (e successivamente modificato e convertito in legge con la Legge n. 199/2016) ed è recentemente entrato in vigore ma è ancora per alcuni aspetti in attesa della normativa secondaria per la sua implementazione.

The so called “Banks Decree” Decree (Law Decree no. 59/2016, hereinafter the “Decree”), published on the Official Gazette and converted into Law no. 199/2016, has recently entered into force.

The main purpose of the Decree is to grant a partial reimbursement to investors of few local banks that were resolved in November 2015. However, the Decree has also introduced additional innovations which represent a further significant step in the Government’s effort of streamlining the credit recovery activities and implementing a more creditor-friendly environment.

Italy's latest law reforms continue with creditor-friendly amendments to support the local banking sector while providing confidence to investors.

Decree Law No. 59/2016 (the so-called "Banks Decree," hereinafter the Decree) was published in the Official Gazette (the Decree was later amended and converted into law by Law No. 119/2016) and has recently entered into force.

Sometimes different bits of legislation are, on the face of it, in conflict with each other. This is specially so when new law is introduced. The impact of new law on old law sets up contradictions, which the courts have to sort out. An interesting recent example arose in the context of business rescue.

The issue in this case was whether a payment of R389 593.49 by Ditona – a company being wound-up – to another company Eravin, was recoverable by Ditona’s liquidators as a void disposition or unrecoverable because, it was a pre-business rescue debt, which may not be enforced.

On 21 September 2016, the Western Cape High Court (Court) handed down judgement in the case of Tyre Corporation Cape Town (Pty) Ltd and Others v GT Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Others (Rogers J) [2016] ZAWCHC 124 in terms of which the Court considered, among other questions, the following:

It is now generally accepted that the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act) is an overhaul of our corporate law landscape. This shift is even more evident with the introduction of a new business rescue regime and along with it, the general moratorium on legal proceedings against a company in business rescue.

Section 133 of the Act provides that no legal proceedings including enforcement action may commence or continue against a company undergoing business rescue, save where amongst other exceptions, consent is granted by the court or obtained from the business rescue practitioner.

Prescription is one word which every creditor (and attorney) dread. Prescription extinguishes a debt and there is very little a creditor can do once that proverbial ship has sailed.

The Prescription Act, No 68 of 1969 (Prescription Act), on a good day, has its challenges, but the situation is even more uncertain when an insolvent estate is concerned.

Rogers J, with Nuku J concurring, in the recent judgment of Van Deventer and Another v Nedbank Ltd 2016 (3) SA 622 (WCC) shed some very needed light on this issue.

In Hattingh v Roux NO & Others 2011 (3) SA 135 (WCC), the plaintiff, Hattingh, sought to show that the defendant, Roux junior, intentionally and unlawfully injured Hattingh by executing an illegal and highly dangerous manoeuvre during a scrum in an Under 19 rugby match between two Western Cape high school teams.

Among other issues considered by the court was the delictual ground of intent: whether Roux junior, if he had in fact executed the manoeuvre which injured Hattingh, acted negligently or intentionally in doing so.