In an 8-1decision issued on May 20, the Supreme Court held that rejection of an executory trademark license agreement in a bankruptcy of the licensor is merely a breach, and not a termination or rescission, of the agreement. The licensee retains whatever rights it would have had upon a breach of the agreement prior to bankruptcy and can continue to use the trademarks pursuant to its contractual rights under applicable law. Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. ___, No. 17-1657 (May 20, 2019).

Background

What Is the "Rule in Gibbs"?

The rule in Gibbs is a long-established common law principle in which the Court of Appeal determined that a debt governed by English law cannot be discharged or compromised by a foreign insolvency proceeding(Anthony Gibbs and Sons v La Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399). The rule in Gibbs remains a fundamental tenet of English insolvency law.

Why Does the Rule in Gibbs Matter?

In a brief but significant opinion, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware reversed a decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and allowed more than $30 million in unsecured, post-petition fees incurred by an indenture trustee ("Indenture Trustee").1 In reversing, the District Court relied upon a uniform body of Court of Appeals opinions issued on the subject.

In Re Kin Ming Toy Manufactory Ltd (in liquidation), HCCW 402/2015 [2018] HKCFI 2057 and 2285, Harris J of the Court of First Instance dismissed an application under section 182 of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (the Ordinance), Cap. 32, brought by the liquidators of a company in liquidation seeking to void two payments made out of the company’s bank account after commencement of the winding up proceedings, and further ordered that the liquidators be held personally liable for the costs of the unsuccessful application.

Key Facts

In the past couple of decades, jurisdictions all over the world have been required to grapple with problems arising out of corporate insolvencies with cross-border elements. Solving these problems has required considerable judicial flexibility and innovation, but judges in some jurisdictions have been helped by the enactment of legislation designed to deal with cross-border status.

The impact of an arbitration clause on the Court’s discretion to grant a winding up order was recently considered by the Court of First Instance in Hong Kong.

In Lasmos Limited v Southwest Pacific Bauxite (HK) Limited (HCCW 227/2017; [2018] HKCFI 426), the Court dismissed a winding up petition in view of an arbitration clause contained in the agreement between the parties and held that the dispute concerning the alleged debt should be dealt with in accordance with the arbitration clause.

Facts

In a recent winding-up case, Discreet Ltd v. Wing Bo Building Construction Co., Ltd [2017] HCCW 49/2017, the Court confirmed that when there is clearly a cross-claim which exceeds the sum claimed by the petitioner, and it is clear that the cross-claim is genuine and based on substantial grounds, the petition can amount to an abuse of process.

Background

On October 20, 2017, in In re MPM Silicones, LLC ("Momentive"), Nos. 15-1682, 15-1771, 15-1824, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, considering the Supreme Court's opinion in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004), adopted the Sixth Circuit's two-step approach to determining an appropriate cramdown interest rate that, in certain circumstances, results in the application of a market rate of interest. In doing so, the Second Circuit reversed the bankruptcy and district court holdings on the cramdown interest rate issue.

Generally speaking, the most appropriate jurisdiction in which to wind up a company is the jurisdiction where the company is incorporated, and the jurisdiction to wind up a foreign company has often been described as exorbitant or as usurping the functions of the courts of the country of incorporation.

The case of Wing Hong Construction Limited v Hui Chi Yung and Ors [2017] HKEC 1173 provides an overview of the legal principles which apply to an application for security for costs, where the Plaintiff against whom security is sought is a company and the application is made under section 905 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622). This was an appeal against the decision of a Master who had dismissed the Defendant’s application for security for costs against the Plaintiff which was a private company in liquidation. The appeal was allowed and security for costs of HK$2 million ordered.