Asset freeze measures enacted by the United Kingdom against designated persons (DPs) can, under certain circumstances, extend to entities “owned or controlled” by DPs. To date, there have been few—and at times partly contradictory—English court cases addressing the “ownership and control” criteria under the UK sanctions regime. The latest judgment in Hellard v OJSC Rossiysky Kredit Bank sought to reconcile the previous guidance provided by the courts in the Mints and Litasco cases.
The US Supreme Court ruled in a landmark 5-4 decision on June 27, 2024 that nonconsensual third-party releases, as proposed in Purdue Pharma’s bankruptcy plan, were not permissible under the Bankruptcy Code. A nonconsensual third-party release serves to eliminate the direct claims of third parties against nondebtor parties without soliciting the consent of such affected claimants. This contrasts with consensual releases and opt-in or opt-out mechanisms permitted by courts.
As a wise man is wont to say, “Where you stand depends on where you sit.”
This statement applies with full force to the recent, related opinions from Judge Marvin Isgur of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, addressing the effects of a so-called “uptier” liability management transaction.1
Procedurally, Judge Isgur’s rulings denied in part and granted in part motions for summary judgment, permitting certain claims to proceed to trial beginning on January 25, 2024.
The last 12 months have seen a steady increase in restructuring and stressed or distressed financing transactions in the European market across a range of sectors, including tech, real estate, hospitality, manufacturing and retail.
One of the primary goals of bankruptcy law is to provide debtors with a fresh start by imposing an automatic stay and allowing for claims of reorganizing debtors to be discharged. In environmental law, a primary goal is to ensure that the “polluter pays” for environmental harms. These two goals collide when an entity with environmental liabilities enters bankruptcy. The result is often outcomes that are the exception, rather than the rule, with many unsettled areas of law that can be dealt with by bankruptcy courts in varying ways.
The High Court in Singapore has ordered the winding up of Hodlnaut Pte Ltd, a Singapore based cryptocurrency lending and borrowing platform, as it was cash flow insolvent given that the cryptocurrency funds held by the company from various creditors count as ‘debts’ within the meaning of s125(1)(e) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA).
Celsius’ retail borrowers finally have an answer on who owns the cryptocurrency they deposited into Celsius in exchange for a loan from Celsius – spoiler alert: on November 13, 2023 the bankruptcy court held that Celsius’ terms of service “clearly and unambiguously” gave Celsius ownership of retail borrowers’ cryptocurrency. The bankruptcy court’s decision follows its January 2023 decision which similarly held that the cryptocurrency of Celsius’ “Earn” customers also belonged to Celsius because the terms of service similarly unambiguously granted Celsius title ownership.
Assume that you have a company which has ceased trading and is left with a cash balance. You could extract most of the cash by paying a dividend, but that would be inefficient for tax purposes (resulting in tax rates of up to 39.35%). So, instead, you decide to wind the company up and receive the proceeds as a capital distribution, taking advantage of the lower capital gains tax rates (generally at 10% or 20% depending on the circumstances). Surely that is legitimate?
Can a debtor reinstate a defaulted loan under a Chapter 11 plan without paying default rate interest? This question was analyzed thoroughly in a recent Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court decision by Judge Philip Bentley.
As a director of a company, the regulatory landscape in England and Wales can feel like a scary place. The possible ways a director can become exposed can feel endless – especially if one asks Google.
Just ask any corporate lawyer fortunate enough to own the tome that is the Companies Act 2006. In the absence of becoming a legal expert, what can directors practically do to best protect themselves when carrying out their role?