Section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code is clear that a debtor can discharge a debt for money obtained by a false statement respecting the debtor's financial condition unless that statement is in writing. What has not been clear is whether a debtor's false oral statement regarding a single asset is a "statement respecting the debtor's financial condition" that falls within the ambit of 523(a)(2)(A). If so, debts obtained by such a false oral statement would be dischargeable. If not, then creditors could seek to have such fraudulently obtained debts excepted from discharge.

Lender's Security Interest in Funds Lost Upon Transfer to Debtor's Counsel

The Ninth Circuit recently ruled that a Chapter 11 debtor could not avoid the payment of default interest under a promissory note as a condition to curing and reinstating such promissory note under a Chapter 11 plan. In Pacifica L 51 LLC v. New Investments Inc. (In re New Investments, Inc.), 840 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that its prior rule of allowing a curing debtor to avoid a contractual post-default interest rate in a loan agreement—as decided in Great Western Bank & Trust v.

The First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel recently issued a decision recognizing the rights of trademark licensees when the trademark’s owner files for bankruptcy.

Imagine that while a bankruptcy case is pending, the debtor-in-possession or bankruptcy trustee files a state law claim against one of the estate's creditors. Presumably, if the debtor wins its state law claim, that recovery augments the bankruptcy estate and increases the amount available to pay the debtor's creditors.[1] The creditor, seeking to avoid litigating the action in the debtor's home state court, timely removes the lawsuit to federal court as permitted under 28 U.S.C.

Attributable to Amanda Remus, spokeswoman for Irving H. Picard, SIPA Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS) and his counsel:

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York today approved the SIPA Trustee's request for an allocation of approximately $342 million in recoveries to the BLMIS Customer Fund and has authorized the SIPA Trustee to proceed with the eighth pro rata interim distribution from the Customer Fund to BLMIS customers with allowed claims.

In an order issued today, Judge Dalton of the Middle District of Florida held that in a non-bankruptcy context, allegations that collection of a mortgage debt is barred by the statute of limitations do not form a “plausible basis” for claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, or the Declaratory Judgment Act.

On November 21, 2016, in a case entitled In re Monson,1 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision,2 which held that a debtor's conduct constituted a willful and malicious injury to a creditor within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), because the debtor injured the creditor's right to recover its loan, the injury was intended, and the debtor was conscious of his wrongdoing. Thus, the debt was nondischargeable under 523(a)(6).

Exceptions to the Dischargeability of Debt under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code

The Bankruptcy Code gives a trustee the power to avoid pre-petition fraudulent and preference transfers made by a debtor, except that a trustee may not avoid a transfer that is "made by or to (or for the benefit of)" a party enumerated in 546(e) of the Code "in connection with a securities contract." Although 546(e) has been applied in various circumstances, there is little court guidance on whether 546(e) protects transfers made to repay commercial mortgage-backed securities ("CMBS") loans. One case in particular has applied 546(e) to dismiss such an avoidance action: Krol v.

Burr & Forman lawyers won a significant victory in the Eleventh Circuit earlier this month. In the case In re: David A. Failla, — F.3d — (2016), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that a person who agrees to “surrender” his house in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) may not oppose the creditor’s foreclosure action in state court. Our firm was one of the first to advance this argument, and many, but not all, of the bankruptcy judges in Florida agreed with our interpretation of surrender under the bankruptcy code and related case law.