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On February 25, 2020, in Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, No. 18-1269 (U.S. 2020), the U.S. Supreme Court effectively ruled that the so-called “Bob Richards rule” should not be used to determine which member of a group of corporations filing a consolidated federal income tax return is entitled to a federal income tax refund.

It is almost 30 years since the commencement of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1990 (the “1990 Act”) which introduced the concept of Court protection for certain companies from their creditors to allow a formal restructure of a company’s debt. The examinership process is now governed by Part 10 of the Companies Act 2014 which mirrors the procedure provided for in the 1990 Act.   

Examinership process  

Background

The Applicant, Mr Stephen Wallace was a UK based Liquidator of Carna Meats (UK) Limited (the “Company”). He claimed that his investigations into the Company’s affairs has been impeded by a lack of books and records. The Respondent, Mr George Wallace, was the Company’s former bookkeeper based in Ireland and was identified as holding all of the records of the Company. Despite a number requests from the Liquidator, Mr Wallace did not produce the documents.

The High Court recently considered an application by creditors for directions calling upon a liquidator to reconsider advice he had provided in a report to the ODCE and to carry out further and more forensic investigation into the circumstances which led to the liquidation of the company.

Background

When a company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due, a director’s duties shift from the management of the company for the benefit of the shareholders, to ensuring the company’s creditors are not disadvantaged by the company continuing to trade.

The directors should seek and comply with professional advice from their auditors and solicitors regarding any decision to continue trading for an interim period.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).

We’ve all heard it said a million times - if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. But does that age-old maxim apply to a bankrupt customer offering to pay you 100% of your unsecured claim through a “prepackaged” bankruptcy or under a critical vendor program? The answer can be complicated.

This article explores what it means to be “unimpaired” and paid in full in prepackaged bankruptcies and under critical vendor programs and outlines some of the potential pitfalls that can be faced by unsecured creditors under these scenarios.

We’ve all heard it said a million times - if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. But does that age-old maxim apply to a bankrupt customer offering to pay you 100% of your unsecured claim through a “prepackaged” bankruptcy or under a critical vendor program? The answer can be complicated. 

This article explores what it means to be “unimpaired” and paid in full in prepackaged bankruptcies and under critical vendor programs and outlines some of the potential pitfalls that can be faced by unsecured creditors under these scenarios.

The Supreme Court has just delivered a judgment confirming the entitlement of a judgment debtor to appoint a receiver by way of equitable execution.

The comprehensive judgment is a useful history lesson in the development and expansion of the right to appoint a receiver by way of equitable execution which derives from the old Judicator (Ireland) Act, 1877.

Background

Judgment was obtained by a bank in February 2011 against two borrowers in the amount of €1,064,747.

The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.