Bankruptcy courts appear to be increasingly sending state law claims to the district court for final review, as illustrated by a recent decision from the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas. In Gomez v. Lone Star National Bank (In re Saenz), Jose Gomez financed his acquisition of a restaurant from Humberto Saenz. When the restaurant failed, Gomez sued his lender and Saenz on various claims, but Saenz filed for bankruptcy protection. The lender then moved for summary judgment against Gomez’s claims for common-law fraud and negligence.

On March 10, 2015, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued a memorandum decision in the case of Harrelson v. DSS, Inc. (No. 14-mc-03675), declining to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court and holding that the existence of an arbitration agreement and a class action waiver in that arbitration agreement did not require substantial consideration of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

Facts

The Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc.), No. 14-11590 (11th Cir. March 12, 2015), clarifies the circuit’s stance on the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue nonconsensual, non-debtor releases or bar orders and the circumstances under which such bar orders might be appropriate. In addition, the court gave a broad reading of what it means for a plan to have been proposed in good faith.

The Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc. (In reSeaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc.), No. 14-11590 (11th Cir. March 12, 2015), clarifies the circuit’s stance on the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue nonconsensual, non-debtor releases or bar orders and the circumstances under which such bar orders might be appropriate. In addition, the court gave a broad reading of what it means for a plan to have been proposed in good faith.

Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code that may affect secured creditors.^[1] In 2012, the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”). The ABI Commission is composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.

Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.[1] In 2012 the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”), composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.

On October 17, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court held that under the Delaware Uniform Commercial Code, the subjective intent of a secured party is irrelevant in determining the effectiveness of a UCC-3 termination statement if the secured party authorized its filing.[1]  

Background

Recent case law reminds practitioners and lenders to pay careful attention when drafting prepayment premium provisions in debt instruments or risk having the premiums disallowed in a borrower’s bankruptcy case.

In In re MPM Silicones, LLC, Case No. 14-22503 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (Momentive), the court dismissed a senior lien creditors’ suit alleging that the junior lien creditors breached an intercreditor agreement (ICA) with respect to shared collateral by taking and supporting certain actions adverse to the senior lien creditors.

BACKGROUND

In Lewis Brothers Bakeries, Inc. and Chicago Baking Co. v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2014 WL 2535294 (8th Cir. June 6, 2014)), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a perpetual, royalty-free, assignable, transferable, exclusive trademark license granted in connection with a substantially consummated asset purchase agreement was not an executory contract that could be assumed or rejected by the licensor-debtor in bankruptcy.