The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,¹ Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.

Bankruptcy Judge Christopher S. Sontchi recently ruled in the Energy Future Holdings case¹ that the debtor will not be required to pay the $431 million “make whole” demanded by bondholders upon the debtor’s early payment of the bonds.²

The South African Revenue Service (SARS) published Binding Private Ruling No. 198 on 7 July 2015 (Ruling). The Ruling deals with the distribution by a South African resident company (Subsidiary) of its loan account to its South African holding company (Holding Company) in anticipation of the Subsidiary’s deregistration.

The applicable provisions in the Income Tax Act, No 58 of 1962 (Act) are s10(1)(k), s47, s64D and s64FA(1)(b).

The relevant facts relating to the Ruling are as follows:

In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.

In In re Filene’s Basement, LLC,¹ the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware considered the rejection damages a landlord claimant was entitled to pursuant to Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code after the debtor rejected its lease as part of its reorganization plan.

On 20 May 2015, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) delivered judgment in the matter of African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers & others(228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69, dealing, amongst other things, decisively with the proper interpretation of the words 'binding offer' as they appear in s153(1)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act, 71 of 2008 (Act).

As parties to litigation, creditors often find themselves in a predicament where the individual they have a claim against has assets of insignificant value. The same individual may, however, be a trustee of a discretionary trust owning substantial assets. Faced with this difficulty, creditors are left with little choice but to ask a court to 'go behind the trust' in an attempt to find assets to execute judgment against.

In two recent cases decided in the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), namely,Willow Waters Homeowners Association (Pty) Limited v KOKA NO and others [2015] JOL 32760 (SCA) and Cowin NO v Kyalami Estate Homeowners Association (499/2013) [2014] ZASCA 221, the SCA was asked to consider: