The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.

In In re Filene’s Basement, LLC,¹ the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware considered the rejection damages a landlord claimant was entitled to pursuant to Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code after the debtor rejected its lease as part of its reorganization plan.

Bankruptcy courts appear to be increasingly sending state law claims to the district court for final review, as illustrated by a recent decision from the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas. In Gomez v. Lone Star National Bank (In re Saenz), Jose Gomez financed his acquisition of a restaurant from Humberto Saenz. When the restaurant failed, Gomez sued his lender and Saenz on various claims, but Saenz filed for bankruptcy protection. The lender then moved for summary judgment against Gomez’s claims for common-law fraud and negligence.

On March 10, 2015, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued a memorandum decision in the case of Harrelson v. DSS, Inc. (No. 14-mc-03675), declining to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court and holding that the existence of an arbitration agreement and a class action waiver in that arbitration agreement did not require substantial consideration of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

Facts

The Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc.), No. 14-11590 (11th Cir. March 12, 2015), clarifies the circuit’s stance on the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue nonconsensual, non-debtor releases or bar orders and the circumstances under which such bar orders might be appropriate. In addition, the court gave a broad reading of what it means for a plan to have been proposed in good faith.

The Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc. (In reSeaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc.), No. 14-11590 (11th Cir. March 12, 2015), clarifies the circuit’s stance on the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue nonconsensual, non-debtor releases or bar orders and the circumstances under which such bar orders might be appropriate. In addition, the court gave a broad reading of what it means for a plan to have been proposed in good faith.

Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code that may affect secured creditors.^[1] In 2012, the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”). The ABI Commission is composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.

Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.[1] In 2012 the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”), composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.

On October 17, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court held that under the Delaware Uniform Commercial Code, the subjective intent of a secured party is irrelevant in determining the effectiveness of a UCC-3 termination statement if the secured party authorized its filing.[1]  

Background