The Court of Appeal upheld the finding at trial of HHJ Bird (sitting in the High Court) that save where there is fraud, a debtor is not legally obliged to volunteer information to an assignee regarding his arrangement with the assignor. The dispute arose because Bibby, a factor (and ‘Assignee’), purchased debts from Morleys Ltd (‘the Assignor’), owed to it by HFD Ltd and MCD Ltd (the ‘Customers’/‘Debtors’). The contract between the Assignor and Customers was such that the latter were entitled to a rebate, at the beginning of each calendar year, on purchases made.

Summary

Having successfully obtained judgment for your client in a case where your firm of solicitors is acting under a conditional fee agreement (CFA), it is only natural that thoughts will turn to the firm’s own impending financial reward. But the terms of a CFA, negotiated at the outset of the case, can prove to be a barrier to their underlying commercial purpose: payment by result.

Section 262(1) of the IA 1986 provides that a debtor, creditor or nominee may apply to the court where: (a) a voluntary arrangement approved by a creditors’ meeting summoned under section 257 unfairly prejudices the interests of a creditor of the debtor, or (b) there has been some material irregularity at or in relation to such a meeting. 

The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,¹ Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.

Bankruptcy Judge Christopher S. Sontchi recently ruled in the Energy Future Holdings case¹ that the debtor will not be required to pay the $431 million “make whole” demanded by bondholders upon the debtor’s early payment of the bonds.²

In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.

In In re Filene’s Basement, LLC,¹ the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware considered the rejection damages a landlord claimant was entitled to pursuant to Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code after the debtor rejected its lease as part of its reorganization plan.