INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear Bullard v. Hyde Park Savings Bank (In re Bullard), U.S., No. 14-116 (cert. granted 12/12/14). The Court's decision in this case will resolve a circuit split with regard to whether an order denying confirmation of a bankruptcy plan is a final order appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). The decision has the potential to impact Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 cases.
Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code that may affect secured creditors.[1] In 2012, the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”). The ABI Commission is composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.
Changes may be coming to the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.[1] In 2012 the American Bankruptcy Institute established a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “ABI Commission”), composed of many well-respected restructuring practitioners, including two of the original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, whose advice holds great weight in the restructuring community.
Section 1322(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code1 allows debtors to cure defaults and reinstate a
mortgage on their principal residence "until such residence is sold at a foreclosure sale that is
conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law."2
Like many provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, this one appears fairly straightforward at first glance; a debtor has the right to
cure and reinstate a home mortgage until the property is sold at a foreclosure sale.
On October 17, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court held that under the Delaware Uniform Commercial Code, the subjective intent of a secured party is irrelevant in determining the effectiveness of a UCC-3 termination statement if the secured party authorized its filing.[1]
Background
Recent case law reminds practitioners and lenders to pay careful attention when drafting prepayment premium provisions in debt instruments or risk having the premiums disallowed in a borrower’s bankruptcy case.
In In re MPM Silicones, LLC, Case No. 14-22503 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (Momentive), the court dismissed a senior lien creditors’ suit alleging that the junior lien creditors breached an intercreditor agreement (ICA) with respect to shared collateral by taking and supporting certain actions adverse to the senior lien creditors.
BACKGROUND
Who Will Think of the Tenants: Split in Authority Regarding the Interplay Between Bankruptcy Code Sections 363(f) and 365(h)(1)(A)
The recent Eleventh Circuit case of In re Brown, 746 F.3d 1236 (2014) held that 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2)'s replacement value standard applies even when a Chapter 7 or 13 debtor surrenders collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C). The Eleventh Circuit's decision in In re Brown has an important role in how personal property collateral will be valued in Chapter 7 and 13 cases in the Eleventh Circuit and thus its reasoning is important for creditors to understand.
In Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the Eleventh Circuit became the first federal circuit court of appeals to hold that filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt in a bankruptcy case violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).[1] See No. 13-12389,__ F.3d __, 2014 WL 3361226 (11th Cir.