The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that a debtor in a Chapter 7 case cannot “strip-off” or void a wholly unsecured junior mortgage under section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.

A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that a secured creditor must file its proof of claim no later than the 90-day deadline under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3002(c) in order to receive distributions under a Chapter 13 plan of reorganization.

A copy of the opinion is available here:  Link to Opinion.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.

In In re Filene’s Basement, LLC,¹ the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware considered the rejection damages a landlord claimant was entitled to pursuant to Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code after the debtor rejected its lease as part of its reorganization plan.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently held that a wholly unsecured second mortgage lien may be “stripped off,” even if the property encumbered by the lien is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate due to abandonment by the bankruptcy trustee.

The Bankruptcy Court did not specifically reference the consolidated cases now before the U.S. Supreme Court in Bank of Amer. v. Toledo-Cardona, and Bank of Amer. v. Caulkett, which should resolve the issue of whether a wholly unsecured lien may be stripped off in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

Bankruptcy courts appear to be increasingly sending state law claims to the district court for final review, as illustrated by a recent decision from the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas. In Gomez v. Lone Star National Bank (In re Saenz), Jose Gomez financed his acquisition of a restaurant from Humberto Saenz. When the restaurant failed, Gomez sued his lender and Saenz on various claims, but Saenz filed for bankruptcy protection. The lender then moved for summary judgment against Gomez’s claims for common-law fraud and negligence.

On March 10, 2015, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued a memorandum decision in the case of Harrelson v. DSS, Inc. (No. 14-mc-03675), declining to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court and holding that the existence of an arbitration agreement and a class action waiver in that arbitration agreement did not require substantial consideration of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

Facts

The Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc.), No. 14-11590 (11th Cir. March 12, 2015), clarifies the circuit’s stance on the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue nonconsensual, non-debtor releases or bar orders and the circumstances under which such bar orders might be appropriate. In addition, the court gave a broad reading of what it means for a plan to have been proposed in good faith.

The Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc. (In reSeaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc.), No. 14-11590 (11th Cir. March 12, 2015), clarifies the circuit’s stance on the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue nonconsensual, non-debtor releases or bar orders and the circumstances under which such bar orders might be appropriate. In addition, the court gave a broad reading of what it means for a plan to have been proposed in good faith.