While the arrival of His Royal Highness Prince George Alexander Louis of Cambridge has dominated the British (and the world) headlines this week, the U.K. Supreme Court delivered its own long awaited bundle of joy earlier today. In the latest decision in the laborious Nortel and Lehman litigations, the U.K. Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision and held that pension claims should not be treated as priority claims and, instead, they should rank equally with general unsecured claims.

Thanks to Anna Nicole Smith and the June 2011 landmark Supreme Court decision in Stern v. Marshall, there are seemingly more questions regarding a bankruptcy judge’s authority to enter final orders (or even proposed orders) than ever before. Those unanswered questions have created considerable uncertainty and, not surprisingly, lengthier and costlier litigation in bankruptcy. Thankfully, the Supremes decided on June 24, 2013 that they will address two of the many questions left unanswered by Stern.

Navigating the most recent leg in the Quebecor regatta, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court and ruled that prepetition transfers made in connection with a securities contract may qualify for safe harbor from avoidance actions under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code—even if the transferee is a mere “conduit” or “intermediary” financial institution. In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc. (Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v. American United Life Insurance Co.), No. 12-4270-bk (2d Cir. June 10, 2013).

A New York state court recently denied a motion to dismiss an action brought by a reorganized debtor against the former chair of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the debtor's chapter 11 case.¹  The decision is noteworthy for its holding that the reorganized debtor had standing to commence an action against the former committee member even though the claim was not expressly listed as an asset of the estate in the debtor's chapter 11 disclosure statement.

Background

The Delaware Bankruptcy Court recently held that a third amendment to a lease agreement entered into for the purpose of leasing a second building could not be severed from the original lease agreement; and the debtor was not allowed to reject the lease on that second building under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.

It was just an old jalopy legally repossessed by his credit union . . . until he filed a bankruptcy petition and the red lights of the automatic stay started flashing. Smokey pulled the lender over and started issuing citations so be forewarned, put your hazard lights on and drive carefully through the postpetition fog, because this decision is relevant to all secured creditors under all Bankruptcy Code Chapters, not just car lenders under Chapter 13.

Due to the substantial time and effort involved in negotiating and confirming a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, and the potential for improperly solicited votes to be disqualified, plan proponents generally are well advised to adhere strictly to the plan voting and disclosure requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.  A recent Delaware bankruptcy court decision, In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC,¹ indicates that creditors who actively negotiate the terms of a debtor's reorganization can, under certain circumstances, enter into a formal plan support agreement with the debtor

On occasion, an owner files a chapter 7 bankruptcy during or in connection with an association’s foreclosure.  While that chapter 7 bankruptcy may slow that foreclosure, it will absolutely not end it.  A chapter 7 bankruptcy ‘stays’ that foreclosure, sure.  That chapter 7 bankruptcy stay remains in effect with respect to “property of the estate” until it that property (the unit) is no longer property of the estate.  During the course of a chapter 7 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee eventually ‘abandons’ the property of the estate.  Once that ‘abando

Public policy in New York prompted the establishment of, and recent increase to the Homestead Exemption (the “Exemption”), codified in the CPLR at §5206.  The Exemption, a statutorily created right, affords property owners (and their surviving heirs) certain protections from a creditor’s right to levy against a judgment debtor’s real property for the purpose of satisfying a personal money judgment.  The rationale behind the need for the Exemption is to ensure that a property owner is not left wholly insolvent once his primary residence is taken from him.

In Ben Hur, Judah Ben-Hur’s team of white horses beat Messala’s black horses in the climactic chariot race. In a similar battle to the death in In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, the white horses won again when Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Brendan L. Shannon confirmed Indianapolis Downs’ joint Chapter 11 plan of liquidation (the “Plan”) over a series of hard-fought objections focusing on the implications of a Restructuring Support Agreement and the propriety of third-party releases.