This week, the Court considers a property owner’s claim to an easement over a maintenance road on federal land, and casts doubt on the longstanding “person aggrieved” standing requirement in bankruptcy appeals.
KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P. v. BRENDA BURMAN, ET AL
The Court rejects a property owner’s claim to an easement over a maintenance road on federal land.
In its recent decision in Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., No. 18–1269 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 2020), the Supreme Court held that federal courts may not apply the federal common law “Bob Richards Rule” to determine who owns a tax refund when a parent holding company files a tax return but a subsidiary generated the losses giving rise to the refund. Instead, the court should look to applicable state law.
General Legal Background
The Bottom Line
In an opinion dated Jan. 10, 2020, Bankruptcy Judge Craig A. Gargotta of the Western District of Texas (San Antonio Division) held that a creditor who submits a proof of claim in bankruptcy waives its right to a jury trial, regardless of whether the creditor has couched its claim in protective language purporting to reserve its right to a jury trial. See Schmidt v. AAF Players LLC (In re Legendary Field Exhibitions LLC), 19-05053 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2020).
What Happened?
Background
The Bottom Line
The United States Supreme Court recently issued a unanimous decision in Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, No. 19-938 589 U.S. __ (2020), which held that a bankruptcy court’s unreserved denial of a motion for relief from the automatic stay is a final, immediately appealable order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 158.
What Happened
Introduction
In February 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion that, at first blush, appeared to severely curtail the scope of the transferee protections provided by Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments from a bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers, including transfers “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a “financial institution” in connection with a “securities contract.” A recent decision from the Second Circuit breathes fresh life into the defense.
On May 20, 2019, in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019), the Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits, holding that a licensor’s rejection of a trademark license in bankruptcy constitutes a prepetition breach, but does not terminate the license.
In another decision affecting Chapter 11 cases, U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge, --- S. Ct. ---, 2018 WL 1143822 (2018), on March 5, 2018, the United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Kagan, affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision to review the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of a mixed question of fact and law for clear error, rather than de novo.
On February 27, 2018, the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Sotomayor, resolving a Circuit split over the interpretation of Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution from avoidance on fraudulent transfer grounds.
This two-part article discusses the key concerns, from a non-consolidation and true sale perspective, that arise when an insurance company, as opposed to a bankruptcy-eligible entity, is a sponsor/seller in a securitization or similar structured finance transaction. This Part One introduces the main contrasts between non-con and true sale analysis in a traditional bankruptcy context and such analysis in an insurance-law scenario.