Background

Any disposition of a company's property made after the commencement of its winding up, without the approval of the liquidator, is void. In a 2001 case (Re Industrial Services Company (Dublin) Ltd [2001] 2 I.R.118), the High Court held that the transfer by an account bank of monies from an in-credit account of a company in liquidation to third parties constituted a disposition and the bank could be liable to repay the value of such transfers despite not being aware of the winding up order for the Company.

Lender's Security Interest in Funds Lost Upon Transfer to Debtor's Counsel

William Fry understands that, on 30 January 2017, having regard for the recent implementation of the Solvency II regime, EIOPA's Board of Supervisors adopted a decision (the "Decision") which will replace EIOPA's General Protocol relating to the collaboration of the insurance supervisory authorities of the Member States of the European Union (March 2008 Edition).

We understand that the Decision with replace the General Protocol as of 1 May 2017 (and will be available on EIOPA's website shortly).

In the interim, the General Protocol (March 2008 Edition) continues to apply.

Imagine that while a bankruptcy case is pending, the debtor-in-possession or bankruptcy trustee files a state law claim against one of the estate's creditors. Presumably, if the debtor wins its state law claim, that recovery augments the bankruptcy estate and increases the amount available to pay the debtor's creditors.[1] The creditor, seeking to avoid litigating the action in the debtor's home state court, timely removes the lawsuit to federal court as permitted under 28 U.S.C.

In an order issued today, Judge Dalton of the Middle District of Florida held that in a non-bankruptcy context, allegations that collection of a mortgage debt is barred by the statute of limitations do not form a “plausible basis” for claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, or the Declaratory Judgment Act.

On November 21, 2016, in a case entitled In re Monson,1 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision,2 which held that a debtor's conduct constituted a willful and malicious injury to a creditor within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), because the debtor injured the creditor's right to recover its loan, the injury was intended, and the debtor was conscious of his wrongdoing. Thus, the debt was nondischargeable under 523(a)(6).

Exceptions to the Dischargeability of Debt under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code

The Bankruptcy Code gives a trustee the power to avoid pre-petition fraudulent and preference transfers made by a debtor, except that a trustee may not avoid a transfer that is "made by or to (or for the benefit of)" a party enumerated in 546(e) of the Code "in connection with a securities contract." Although 546(e) has been applied in various circumstances, there is little court guidance on whether 546(e) protects transfers made to repay commercial mortgage-backed securities ("CMBS") loans. One case in particular has applied 546(e) to dismiss such an avoidance action: Krol v.

The Court of Appeal has overturned a High Court ruling from 2015 that a former director of a car dealership was personally liable to a customer who paid the company for three vehicles in the weeks prior to the company's liquidation where the cars were ultimately not delivered to the customer due to the company's liquidation.

Background

Burr & Forman lawyers won a significant victory in the Eleventh Circuit earlier this month. In the case In re: David A. Failla, — F.3d — (2016), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that a person who agrees to “surrender” his house in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) may not oppose the creditor’s foreclosure action in state court. Our firm was one of the first to advance this argument, and many, but not all, of the bankruptcy judges in Florida agreed with our interpretation of surrender under the bankruptcy code and related case law.

On October 11, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States granted cert in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, No. 16-348 (Oct. Term 2016) to resolve a split among the Circuits as to the FDCPA’s prohibition against deceptive collection practices in the context of filing proofs of claim for debts where a collection action would otherwise be time-barred.