A recent case before bankruptcy judge Karen B. Owens of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, In re Dura Auto. Sys., LLC, No. 19-12378 (KBO), 2021 WL 2456944 (Bankr. D. Del. June 16, 2021), provides a cautionary reminder that the Third Circuit does not recognize the doctrine of implied assumption (i.e., assumptions implied through a course of conduct as opposed to those that are assumed pursuant to a motion and court order).
One of the main differences in insolvency law between Scotland and England & Wales relates to the challengeable transactions regime under the Insolvency Act 1986.
In both jurisdictions, transactions that are entered into before a formal insolvency process begins can be attacked if they are detrimental to the creditors of the insolvent company. However, although both systems use similar language and address similar concerns, the law in the two jurisdictions is different, most notably with different time periods and defences to a challenge.
As we reported, on June 21, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to revisit the rigid Brunner standard for determining “undue hardship” capable of discharging student debt. The same day, United States Bankruptcy Judge Michelle M.
The pandemic has created a chaotic business environment in which it is has at times been practically impossible to make any definitive plans. Lockdown measures have changed regularly, legislation has been introduced and extended and the rules for conducting business (when it is even possible to trade) have varied across the UK and have at times been criticised by those most harshly effected as being arbitrary and unscientific. All of this has often happened at very short notice.
As a result of temporary provisions that have been in place since March 2020*, during the Covid period directors have been broadly protected from the risk of personal liability for wrongful trading. Those temporary provisions are due to end on 30 June, 2021 and as a result, the law on wrongful trading again becomes highly relevant.
On Monday, the United States Supreme Court denied Thelma McCoy’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, passing up a golden opportunity to bring uniformity to the “important and recurring question” of how to determine the sort of “undue hardship” that qualifies a debtor for a discharge of student loans under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.
In England, it is common and quite straightforward for companies and LLPs to grant all assets security by way of a debenture which includes a series of fixed charges over specified assets, an assignment of material leases, insurances and other contracts and a floating charge over assets which are not expressly subject to those fixed charges. That same approach does not work in Scotland, at least not without some adaptation.
At stake in a recent decision by the First Circuit was this: when a bankruptcy matter is before a federal district court based on non-core, “related to” jurisdiction, should the court apply the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? The First Circuit ruled that the former apply, and in so doing joined three other circuits that have also considered this issue. Roy v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co.
A creditor in bankruptcy must normally file a proof of claim by a certain specified time, known as the bar date, or have its claim be barred.