UK Government introduces a temporary increase to minimum debt level required for a winding up petition

Restrictions have been in place since the start of the pandemic to prevent creditors taking steps to wind up debtor companies. Those restrictions are due to expire on September 30, 2021. To lessen the risk of October seeing a mass rush by creditors seeking to wind up their debtors, the UK Government has introduced a further temporary measure in connection with liquidation petitions.

In this two part article we highlight for directors some of the main ways in which the general protection of limited liability does not apply or can be lost.

Part one of this article discusses those exceptions to the principle of limited liability that arise in insolvency or distress situations. Part two deals with the provisions that have more general applicability.

Breach of duties

Earlier this month – citing the “virtually unflagging obligation” of an Article III appellate court to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction – the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decried the pervasive overreliance by district courts on the doctrine “equitable mootness” to duck appeals of confirmation orders.[1]

Limited liability is one of the fundamental concepts in our understanding of company law. Even people who know very little about the working of limited companies may know that directors and shareholders are not liable for the debts of their companies. For the last 160 years, the protection of limited liability has been a key factor in economic growth and commercial activity as it has allowed entrepreneurs to speculate and take risks that they might not have been willing to do if the risk of personal liability overshadowed their decision-making.

Judge Stacey Jernigan did not mince words in a recent opinion sanctioning the former CEO of Highland Capital Management, LP. Entities related to the former CEO brought suit against Highland (the debtor in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding), and sought leave from the district court to add Highland’s replacement CEO as a defendant. In Judge Jernigan’s view, such conduct violated her “gatekeeping” orders that required the bankruptcy court’s approval before “pursuing” actions against the new CEO.

The terms "ranking agreement" and "intercreditor agreement" are used interchangeably but generally refer to the same types of agreement - being those which regulate the priority of repayment of indebtedness owed to the creditors of an obligor. Strictly speaking, a ranking agreement is the Scottish equivalent to the English law deed of priorities and is typically used for shorter form ranking arrangements. As is the case in England, a Scottish intercreditor agreement is typically reserved for more complex arrangements and usually ranks both securities and liabilities in point of priority.

In our first and second summaries on the key differences in taking security between Scotland and England, I summarised the positions on the Scots law of assignation and share security respectively.  This is the third summary in that five part series and considers the position on floating charges in Scotland.

A key goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to prevent corporate insiders from profiting from their employer’s misfortune. Section 503(c) of the Code makes clear: “there shall neither be allowed, nor paid... a transfer made to, or an obligation incurred for the benefit of, an insider of the debtor for the purpose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor's business” absent certain court-approved circumstances.

Some courts permit debtors to designate vendors crucial to their business as “critical vendors.” These vendors supply debtors with necessary goods or services. Debtors are permitted to pay them amounts owing when a bankruptcy case is filed. Accordingly, critical vendors often recover more on their pre-petition claims than other unsecured creditors. In other words, critical vendors could receive a full recovery, while other creditors only receive a fraction of what they are owed.

The Bankruptcy Code grants the power to avoid certain transactions to a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547–48. Is there a general requirement that these avoidance powers only be used when doing so would benefit creditors? In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico addressed this question, concluding, in the face of a split of authority, that there was such a requirement.