In an appeal of a bankruptcy court’s decision, a district court judge recently addressed the treatment of the “straddle year” for federal income tax under the Bankruptcy Code, which “does not appear to have been decided by any appellate court.” In re Affirmative Ins. Holdings Inc. United States v. Beskrone, No. 15-12136-CSS, 2020 WL 4287375, at *1 (D. Del. July 27, 2020).

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.

Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, when a transfer is avoided under one of several other sections of the Code, a trustee may recover “the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property” from “the initial transferee of such transfer,” “the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made,” or “any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.” 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).

This post provides a quick primer on the administrative expense claims. These claims are entitled to priority for actual and necessary goods and services supplied to a debtor in bankruptcy. For a claim to qualify for administrative expense status, a debtor must request that the claimant provide goods and services post-petition or induce the claimant to do so. The goods or services must result in a benefit to the bankruptcy estate. And the claimant bears the burden of proof that a claim qualifies for priority treatment under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).

We’ve reported here and here on the January 2019 bankruptcy filing by Pacific Gas and Electric (“PG&E”), which was primarily the result of potential liability stemming from catastrophic California wildfires.

This significant recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada confirms (i) that a CCAA supervising judge enjoys broad discretion and the necessary jurisdiction to prevent a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement when the creditor is acting for an improper purpose, and (ii) that litigation funding is not intrinsically illegal and that a litigation funding agreement can be approved by the Court as an interim financing in insolvency.

Cette importante décision prononcée dernièrement par la Cour suprême du Canada confirme : (i) que le juge chargé d’appliquer la LACC possède un vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire et la compétence nécessaire pour empêcher un créancier de voter sur un plan d’arrangement s’il agit dans un but illégitime, (ii) que le financement de litiges n’est pas intrinsèquement illégal et qu’un accord de financement de litige peut être approuvé par la Cour à titre de financement temporaire en situation d’insolvabilité.

This significant recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada confirms (i) that a CCAA supervising judge enjoys broad discretion and the necessary jurisdiction to prevent a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement when the creditor is acting for an improper purpose, and (ii) that litigation funding is not intrinsically illegal and that a litigation funding agreement can be approved by the Court as an interim financing in insolvency.

Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”^[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,^[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by

Courts reviewing a bankruptcy court’s decision to approve a chapter 11 reorganization plan over the objections of an interested party must consider not only the merits, but also (if implementation of the plan was not stayed) potential injury to the reliance interests of other parties relying on the plan. These issues are confronted in Drivetrain, LLC v. Kozel (In re Abengoa Bioenergy Biomass of Kansas), 2020 WL 2121449 (10th Cir.