Some courts permit debtors to designate vendors crucial to their business as “critical vendors.” These vendors supply debtors with necessary goods or services. Debtors are permitted to pay them amounts owing when a bankruptcy case is filed. Accordingly, critical vendors often recover more on their pre-petition claims than other unsecured creditors. In other words, critical vendors could receive a full recovery, while other creditors only receive a fraction of what they are owed.
The Bankruptcy Code grants the power to avoid certain transactions to a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547–48. Is there a general requirement that these avoidance powers only be used when doing so would benefit creditors? In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico addressed this question, concluding, in the face of a split of authority, that there was such a requirement.
On June 17, 2021, McCarthy Tétrault virtually hosted A Panel Discussion about the CCAA with Partners Heather Meredith, Jacques Rousse, and Awanish Sinha. The discussion focused on the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (“CCAA”), reasons why organizations use the CCAA, and particular insights about the Laurentian University CCAA proceeding.
The following are some key takeaways from the panel:
A recent case before bankruptcy judge Karen B. Owens of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, In re Dura Auto. Sys., LLC, No. 19-12378 (KBO), 2021 WL 2456944 (Bankr. D. Del. June 16, 2021), provides a cautionary reminder that the Third Circuit does not recognize the doctrine of implied assumption (i.e., assumptions implied through a course of conduct as opposed to those that are assumed pursuant to a motion and court order).
As we reported, on June 21, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to revisit the rigid Brunner standard for determining “undue hardship” capable of discharging student debt. The same day, United States Bankruptcy Judge Michelle M.
On Monday, the United States Supreme Court denied Thelma McCoy’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, passing up a golden opportunity to bring uniformity to the “important and recurring question” of how to determine the sort of “undue hardship” that qualifies a debtor for a discharge of student loans under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.
Dans l’affaire Chandos Construction Ltd c Restructuration Deloitte Inc, la Cour suprême rend une décision concernant le test applicable à la règle anti-privation, qui a pour but d’empêcher de contourner les règles législatives et de common law d’insolvabilité par voie contractuelle.
In the matter of Chandos Construction Ltd v Restructuring Deloitte Inc, the Supreme Court of Canada issued a judgment on the anti-deprivation rule, which is intended to prevent contracts from frustrating statutory and common law rules relating to insolvency. The Court established that a clause triggered by an event of insolvency or bankruptcy and which has the effect of removing value from the insolvent’s estate is void and unenforceable.
At stake in a recent decision by the First Circuit was this: when a bankruptcy matter is before a federal district court based on non-core, “related to” jurisdiction, should the court apply the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? The First Circuit ruled that the former apply, and in so doing joined three other circuits that have also considered this issue. Roy v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co.