In the landmark case of Re China Huiyuan Juice Group Limited [2020] HKCFI 2940, Mr Justice Harris recalibrated the Hong Kong winding-up jurisdiction and its application to an offshore incorporated, Hong Kong-listed entity.

In particular, the decision explains why the Hong Kong court may be unable to wind-up an offshore incorporated, Hong Kong-listed company where all of the company’s operating assets are in the Mainland.

The Material Facts

Hot on the heels of a trio of decisions concerning offshore provisional liquidation, which opened a new and commendable era for Hong Kong’s cross-border insolvency regime (see https://dvc.hk/en/news/cases-detail/heralding-a-new-and-healthy-era-of-cross-border-insolvency-recognition-in-hong-kong-re-fdg-electric-vehicles-ltd-re-

Through a trio of decisions, Mr Justice Harris has opened a new and commendable era for Hong Kong’s cross-border insolvency regime. The position under this new era is in brief thus:

First, the Hong Kong court is likely to use the debtor’s centre of main interests (“COMI”) as a yardstick to determine eligibility for recognition and assistance.

Correcting a widespread mistake, Mr Justice Harris in Re China Ocean Industry Group Ltd [2021] HKCFI 247 held that the Court has no jurisdiction to make a validation order after a winding-up petition in respect of the issue of new shares and convertible bonds (“CBs”).

The correct position is that a company subject to a winding-up petition may issue new shares and CBs without a validation order.

Background to the widespread mistake and the present case

In the landmark case of Re China Huiyuan Juice Group Limited [2020] HKCFI 2940, Mr Justice Harris recalibrated the Hong Kong winding-up jurisdiction and its application to an offshore incorporated, Hong Kong-listed entity.

In particular, the decision explains why the Hong Kong court may be unable to wind up an offshore incorporated, Hong Kong-listed company where all of the company’s operating assets are in the Mainland.

The material facts

On Sunday, December 27, 2020, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which provides $900 billion in a second wave of economic stimulus relief for industries and individuals faced with challenges from the COVID-19 coronavirus.

The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered unprecedented levels of business disruption and forced numerous companies into bankruptcy in an effort to preserve dwindling liquidity and postpone creditor demands. Retailers, whose brick-and-mortar locations were already struggling to adapt to an increasingly online marketplace, have been among the hardest hit. A number of bankruptcy judges, faced with the prospect of an avalanche of forced liquidations, have thrown these debtors a lifeline by approving requests to suspend lease payments.

If the current coronavirus (COVID-19) situation persists, real estate lenders increasingly will be faced with the need to restructure loans in their portfolios. Lenders that held non-performing real estate loans during prior real estate downturns (e.g., 2008, 1990s) have no doubt embarked on the real estate workout process countless times before. However, with the passage of time, the lessons learned by real estate lenders of earlier eras may have faded from memory. Moreover, many of the lenders active in real estate finance today were not even on the scene during prior recessions.