As discussed in our prior blog entitled “New York’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Proposals,”[1] three bills were introduced in the New York state legislature to overhaul the way sovereign debt restructurings are handled in New York. Those bills sought to implement a comprehensive mechanism for restructuring sovereign debt, limit recovery on certain sovereign debt claims, and amend the champerty defense.

The first half of 2023 witnessed the failure of three financial institutions in quick succession—Silicon Valley Bank (March 10, 2023), Signature Bank (March 12, 2023), and First Republic Bank (May 1, 2023). This was the first time three financial institutions failed in such a compressed time period since the Great Recession of 2008.

The saga of the first Ultra Petroleum Corp. chapter 11 cases appears to have finally come to an end. Numerous articles have been written on the tortured history of whether certain creditors of Ultra Petroleum are entitled to payment of their contractually mandated Make-Whole Amount and default rate of interest.

Despite optimistic predictions earlier in 2022, slowedglobal growth resulting, in part, from the war in Ukraine has elevated inflation and interest rates, reducing the availability of credit, increasing business borrowing costs and threatening the ability of companies to retain the confidence of their

The Commercial List of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice recently granted an order structurally similar to a reverse vesting order in the receivership proceedings of Vert Infrastructure Ltd. (Vert). This first-of-its-kind order was granted on the motion of Vert’s receiver, KSV Restructuring Inc. (KSV).¹

Although 2020 may be behind us, the economic conditions and lockdowns caused by the COVID-19 pandemic still linger. With the emerging picture for Canada in 2021 looking to largely resemble that of 2020, many are wondering how long struggling businesses and their creditors can hold their breath while waiting for improved cash flows and customer demand.

In the past several years, the United States has seen a tidal wave of retail sector chapter 11 cases. The end result for most of those cases has been going out of business and liquidation sales. On March 11, 2020, Modell’s Sporting Goods commenced its chapter 11 cases seeking to follow a similar path taken by other retailers by closing all 153 sporting goods stores in a controlled liquidation. Unfortunately for Modell’s, the COVID-19 crisis hit the United States just as Modell’s commenced its liquidation.

In Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443 (2007), the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy law does not disallow a post-petition unsecured claim for attorney’s fees to the extent such claim is authorized by a pre-petition contract and not otherwise expressly disallowed. That pronouncement should have stopped all future litigation over the issue. That has not been the case.

On appeal from a decision in the In re Energy Future Holdings Corp. bankruptcy case, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that contractual make-whole premium provisions are enforceable where the obligation to repay bond debt is accelerated by a bankruptcy filing.

Much has been written in the past several years regarding the scope of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. ___ (2011) and Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. ___ (2014). Now, the Supreme Court has weighed in again in the case of Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., et al v. Sharif, 575 U.S. ___ (2015) in an attempt to clarify the confusion created by Stern.