As discussed in our prior blog entitled “New York’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Proposals,”[1] three bills were introduced in the New York state legislature to overhaul the way sovereign debt restructurings are handled in New York. Those bills sought to implement a comprehensive mechanism for restructuring sovereign debt, limit recovery on certain sovereign debt claims, and amend the champerty defense.
The first half of 2023 witnessed the failure of three financial institutions in quick succession—Silicon Valley Bank (March 10, 2023), Signature Bank (March 12, 2023), and First Republic Bank (May 1, 2023). This was the first time three financial institutions failed in such a compressed time period since the Great Recession of 2008.
The saga of the first Ultra Petroleum Corp. chapter 11 cases appears to have finally come to an end. Numerous articles have been written on the tortured history of whether certain creditors of Ultra Petroleum are entitled to payment of their contractually mandated Make-Whole Amount and default rate of interest.
On March 27, 2020, President Trump signed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act or the “CARES Act.”The legislation includes a historic $2 trillion aid package intended to stabilize the U.S. economy and provide disaster relief aid to American citizens and businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. The emergency aid package, which is by far the largest in American history, contains many provisions focused on providing relief. Among these are certain temporary amendments to Title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).
In the past several years, the United States has seen a tidal wave of retail sector chapter 11 cases. The end result for most of those cases has been going out of business and liquidation sales. On March 11, 2020, Modell’s Sporting Goods commenced its chapter 11 cases seeking to follow a similar path taken by other retailers by closing all 153 sporting goods stores in a controlled liquidation. Unfortunately for Modell’s, the COVID-19 crisis hit the United States just as Modell’s commenced its liquidation.
INTRODUCTION
In times of unprecedented market uncertainty, assessing financial exposure to your counterparties is essential. Volatility in the commodities markets and a public health crisis create the perfect storm for financial distress for companies in nearly every industry. Risk is inherent in business and that risk is heightened when you are dealing with a company in financial distress. Managing these risks begins with knowing your counterparties and understanding your legal position with respect to those counterparties.
Countries across the world are actively taking measures to stem the spread of COVID-19 by encouraging and, in some cases, forcing social distancing. One of the most common measures employed so far is the closing of non-essential stores, bars and restaurants for several weeks, if not longer. Several large retailers, such as JCPenney, Ross Stores, Kirkland’s Inc., Marshalls and TJ Maxx, have announced store closings for two weeks in efforts to help stop the spread of COVID-19.
In Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443 (2007), the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy law does not disallow a post-petition unsecured claim for attorney’s fees to the extent such claim is authorized by a pre-petition contract and not otherwise expressly disallowed. That pronouncement should have stopped all future litigation over the issue. That has not been the case.
On appeal from a decision in the In re Energy Future Holdings Corp. bankruptcy case, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that contractual make-whole premium provisions are enforceable where the obligation to repay bond debt is accelerated by a bankruptcy filing.
Much has been written in the past several years regarding the scope of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. ___ (2011) and Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. ___ (2014). Now, the Supreme Court has weighed in again in the case of Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., et al v. Sharif, 575 U.S. ___ (2015) in an attempt to clarify the confusion created by Stern.