The terms "ranking agreement" and "intercreditor agreement" are used interchangeably but generally refer to the same types of agreement - being those which regulate the priority of repayment of indebtedness owed to the creditors of an obligor. Strictly speaking, a ranking agreement is the Scottish equivalent to the English law deed of priorities and is typically used for shorter form ranking arrangements. As is the case in England, a Scottish intercreditor agreement is typically reserved for more complex arrangements and usually ranks both securities and liabilities in point of priority.

In our first and second summaries on the key differences in taking security between Scotland and England, I summarised the positions on the Scots law of assignation and share security respectively.  This is the third summary in that five part series and considers the position on floating charges in Scotland.

In England, it is common and quite straightforward for companies and LLPs to grant all assets security by way of a debenture which includes a series of fixed charges over specified assets, an assignment of material leases, insurances and other contracts and a floating charge over assets which are not expressly subject to those fixed charges. That same approach does not work in Scotland, at least not without some adaptation.

A floating charge will usually set out the rights exercisable by the floating charge holder after the point at which that floating charge has become "enforceable".  The floating charge might also contain language clarifying when the charge is deemed to be enforceable - typically after the occurrence of an event of default set out in the underlying facility agreement which is secured by that charge

Until 2013, no circuit court of appeals had weighed in on the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the 203 North LaSalle case that property retained by a junior stakeholder under a cram-down chapter 11 plan in exchange for new value “without benefit of market valuation” violates the “absolute priority rule.” See Bank of Amer. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), reversing Matter of 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997).

2012 is shaping up as a year of bankruptcy first impressions for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals sailed into uncharted bankruptcy waters twice already this year in the same chapter 11 case. On January 24, the court ruled in In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 2012 WL 178998 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 2012) ("Thorpe I"), that an appeal by certain nonsettling asbestos insurers of an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not equitably moot because, among other things, the plan had not been "substantially consummated" under the court's novel construction of that statutory term.