We recently reported on Delaware Judge Christopher Sontchi’s decision in the Extraction bankruptcy to permit the rejection of midstream gathering agreements.1 Fellow Delaware Judge Karen Owens followed Extraction in the Southland Royalty decision issued November 13, 2020.2 Judge Owens determined that Southland Royalty Company, LLC (“Southland”), an E&P operator with assets primarily in Wyoming, could reject the gas gathering agreement and sell its assets free and clear of the agreement.
In the latest saga concerning “covenants running with the land” and the rejection of midstream gathering agreements under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code), the Honorable Christopher Sontchi, Chief Judge of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court (the Court), issued three1 decisions holding that certain of Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc.’s (Extraction) gathering agreements with its midstream service providers did not create real property interests and, thus, that Extraction could reject such gathering agreements in its chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.
Until 2013, no circuit court of appeals had weighed in on the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the 203 North LaSalle case that property retained by a junior stakeholder under a cram-down chapter 11 plan in exchange for new value “without benefit of market valuation” violates the “absolute priority rule.” See Bank of Amer. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), reversing Matter of 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997).
2012 is shaping up as a year of bankruptcy first impressions for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals sailed into uncharted bankruptcy waters twice already this year in the same chapter 11 case. On January 24, the court ruled in In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 2012 WL 178998 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 2012) ("Thorpe I"), that an appeal by certain nonsettling asbestos insurers of an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not equitably moot because, among other things, the plan had not been "substantially consummated" under the court's novel construction of that statutory term.