Until 2013, no circuit court of appeals had weighed in on the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the 203 North LaSalle case that property retained by a junior stakeholder under a cram-down chapter 11 plan in exchange for new value “without benefit of market valuation” violates the “absolute priority rule.” See Bank of Amer. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), reversing Matter of 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997).

2012 is shaping up as a year of bankruptcy first impressions for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals sailed into uncharted bankruptcy waters twice already this year in the same chapter 11 case. On January 24, the court ruled in In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 2012 WL 178998 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 2012) ("Thorpe I"), that an appeal by certain nonsettling asbestos insurers of an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not equitably moot because, among other things, the plan had not been "substantially consummated" under the court's novel construction of that statutory term.

InJ.D. Brian Ltd (in liquidation) & Others the High Court held that, where a floating charge crystallised prior to the commencement of a winding-up, the preferential creditors still had priority pursuant to in section 285 of the Companies Act 1963 over the holder of what had become a fixed charge.

The English court of appeal has held that a company should not be held to be balance sheet insolvent on the sole basis that its liabilities (including contingent and prospective liabilities) exceed its assets.

In BNY Corporate Trustee Services v Eurosail & Ors, the Court of Appeal considered in detail, for the first time, the construction of section 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, which sets out circumstances in which a company can be deemed to be unable to pay its debts.

The relevant portions of section 123 provide as follows:

In Re: Michael McLoughlin Pharmacy Ltd. The examiner sought the High Court’s approval for a scheme of arrangement which limited his liability for negligence. The secured creditor objected as a matter of principle because such limitations of liability had become commonplace in schemes. The secured creditor made it clear that there was no suggestion of any negligence by the examiner in the particular case.

The court considered:

InDellway and Ors. v National Asset Management Agency & Ors., a number of companies and Paddy McKillen appealed a decision of the High Court in relation to the purported acquisition of €2∙1 billion in loans to the appellant companies by NAMA.

The appeal was brought on five grounds:

In Re McInerney Homes Limited

In the McInerney case, the company and the examiner sought to have schemes confirmed which would result in an immediate payment to a banking syndicate of €25 million. The banking syndicate contended that the discounted current value which they expected to recover from their security outside any schemes was €50 million.

Kerr & Ors v Conduit Enterprises Ltd

In 1997 the two directors of the company and others purchased a building and leased it to the company. Ownership of the company changed hands a number of times and, in 2008, the then new owners purported to void the lease on the basis that it had never been approved by shareholder resolution. The landlords issued proceedings seeking a declaration that the lease was valid.

The court held that:

In a series of cases the High Court has:

In January 2010 an interim examiner was appointed to Missford Limited, which operated the Residence Club, a private members club in St. Stephen’s Green.

In a written judgment on the costs and expenses of the interim examiner, the court held that the interim examiner “simply did more with the best of motives than his warrant permitted”. The court proceeded to refuse the interim examiner’s application for remuneration in respect of any work carried out in excess of his statutory powers.

In the matter of Cognotec Ltd (in receivership)

Section 60(14) provides that a transaction in breach of section 60 is voidable against any person who had notice of the facts which constitute the breach.

The company sought to void the debenture which secured the loan on the basis that section 60 had not been complied with and the receiver appointed on foot of the debenture brought a motion for directions.

The court held that: