When it comes to voting on a plan, Section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court may designate (or disallow) the votes of any entity whose vote to accept or reject was not made in “good faith” (a term that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code).
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).
On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.
On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta
On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.
In Reilly & Personal Insolvency Acts 2012-2015 [2017] IEHC 558, Baker J, 5 October, 2017, the High Court held that applications to Court under Section 115A of the Personal Insolvency Acts 2012-2015 (the Acts), for approval of a Personal Insolvency Arrangement (PIA) despite its rejection by creditors, must be made by a Personal Insolvency Practitioner (PIP) and not by the Debtor themselves.
Baker J in the High Court has given three recent judgments in matters concerning Section 115A(9) of the Personal Insolvency Acts 2012 – 2015 (the Acts). This Section gives a Court power to review and approve a Personal Insolvency Application (PIA) rejected at a meeting of creditors.
Re JD (a debtor) [2017] IEHC 119, High Court, 21 February 2017
In the case of In Re Dunne (A Debtor) [2017] IEHC 59, High Court, Baker J, 6 February 2017 the High Court refused an application by debtors under Section 115A of the Personal Insolvency Acts 2012 to 2015 to overturn a secured creditor's (PTSB) objection to a Personal Insolvency Arrangement (PIA). The debtors had appealed from a Circuit Court decision upholding PTSB's objection.
Facts
In two recent decisions the High Court considered the provisions of Section 115A(9) of the Personal Insolvency Acts 2012 to 2015 (The Acts). The Section provides that a Court can give effect to a Personal Insolvency Arrangement (PIA) despite it having been rejected by creditors. It was designed to enable a qualifying debtor to retain their principal private residence in certain circumstances.