The application of sovereign immunity principles in bankruptcy cases has vexed the courts for decades. The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions on the matter have not helped much. Although they have addressed the issue in specific contexts, they have not established clear guidelines that the lower courts may apply more generally. The Third Circuit took a crack at clarifying this muddy but important area of the law in the case of Venoco LLC (with its affiliated debtors, the “Debtors”).
Background
On May 3, 2021, Judge Marvin Isgur of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas held that indenture trustees must satisfy the “substantial contribution” standard to obtain administrative expense status for their fees and expenses incurred in a chapter 11 case. In his ruling, Judge Isgur expressly rejected the indenture trustee’s argument that it could obtain administrative expense status upon a showing that its fees and expenses were an actual, necessary cost of preserving the debtor’s estate.
On May 11, 2021, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (“Court”) issued a decision[1] dismissing the chapter 11 cases of the National Rifle Association of America and its affiliate (“NRA”) for cause pursuant to section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Chapter 11 plans commonly protect a debtor’s key stakeholders that participate in the chapter 11 process from claims arising in connection with the bankruptcy case. The Office of the United States Trustee (the “US Trustee”), the branch of the Department of Justice tasked with monitoring bankruptcy cases, has recently taken aim at limiting the use and scope of these “exculpation” provisions in large restructuring cases across the country.
Background and Standards
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas recently clarified the administrative expense standard applicable to indenture trustees by holding that they can recover fees and expenses as administrative expenses only when they make a “substantial contribution.” This standard requires a greater showing than “benefit to the estate,” which is the general administrative expense standard. In re Sanchez Energy Corp., No. 19-34508 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 3, 2021).
Background
On April 19, 2021, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari from the Second Circuit’s decision in In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation (“Tribune II”),[1] leaving intact the Second Circuit’s decision upholding the safe harbor defense to avoidance actions und
Turns out, it depends on who you ask. Judge Bernstein said no. Recently, Judge Glenn said yes, but only for causes of action that resemble actual fraudulent transfers. It is unusual for the bankruptcy judges in Manhattan to disagree with each other, so let’s take a look at the issue.
Background
In a first, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the Arcapita Bank case had to decide whether Shari’a compliant investment agreements, providing for Murabaha and Wakala transactions, qualify for the safe harbor protections provided in the bankruptcy code for securities contracts, forwards and swaps. The court held that they do not. Since the opinion runs about 100 pages long, we attempt to distill some very basic facts concerning Shari’a compliant transactions and point to important holdings made by the court.
Shari’a Compliant Transactions
“The discharge of claims in bankruptcy applies with no less force to claims that are meritorious, sympathetic, or diligently pursued. Though the result may chafe one’s innate sense of fairness, not all unfairness represents a violation of due process.”
On March 19, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a unanimous decision[1] affirming that the mutuality requirement of section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code must be strictly construed and, therefore, that triangular setoffs are not permissible in bankruptcy.