Companies House temporarily paused their strike off processes in April 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The effect of this was to stay all strike off action. The stay was lifted on 10 October 2020 but stayed for a second time on 21 January 2021.

The second stay was lifted on 8 March 2021 and, absent further significant disruption caused by COVID-19, is unlikely to be subject to a further stay.

In Sarjanda Ltd (in liquidation) v Aluminium Eco Solutions Ltd and another [2021] EWHC 210 (Ch), an application to rescind a winding up order was refused where the application had been made over two years outside of the five-day time limit. That level of delay, allegedly caused by the company negotiating payment of its debts, was not a good enough reason for the breach of the time limit.

Practitioners are likely to be familiar with the provisions of The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (“CIGA 2020”) which introduced new permanent measures to complement the insolvency regime as well as a number of temporary measures to support business dealing with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In 2016, the High Court determined that a person may propose to do something without having a settled intention to do it and dismissed an application for an order removing a fourth notice of intention from the court file. At the time the fourth notice was filed, the director only intended to appoint administrators if a CVA proposal was rejected by creditors.

In a recent opinion, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland dealt with a conflict between the strong presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements and the Bankruptcy Code’s emphasis on centralization of claims. Based on an analysis of the two statutory schemes and their underlying policies and concerns, the Court decided to lift the automatic stay to allow the prepetition arbitration proceeding to go forward with respect to non-core claims.

Background

The application of sovereign immunity principles in bankruptcy cases has vexed the courts for decades. The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions on the matter have not helped much. Although they have addressed the issue in specific contexts, they have not established clear guidelines that the lower courts may apply more generally. The Third Circuit took a crack at clarifying this muddy but important area of the law in the case of Venoco LLC (with its affiliated debtors, the “Debtors”).

Background

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas recently clarified the administrative expense standard applicable to indenture trustees by holding that they can recover fees and expenses as administrative expenses only when they make a “substantial contribution.” This standard requires a greater showing than “benefit to the estate,” which is the general administrative expense standard. In re Sanchez Energy Corp., No. 19-34508 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 3, 2021).

Background

Turns out, it depends on who you ask. Judge Bernstein said no. Recently, Judge Glenn said yes, but only for causes of action that resemble actual fraudulent transfers. It is unusual for the bankruptcy judges in Manhattan to disagree with each other, so let’s take a look at the issue.

Background

In a first, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the Arcapita Bank case had to decide whether Shari’a compliant investment agreements, providing for Murabaha and Wakala transactions, qualify for the safe harbor protections provided in the bankruptcy code for securities contracts, forwards and swaps. The court held that they do not. Since the opinion runs about 100 pages long, we attempt to distill some very basic facts concerning Shari’a compliant transactions and point to important holdings made by the court.

Shari’a Compliant Transactions

In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a purported debt held by an entity with a near-majority membership interest in the Debtor was actually equity disguised as a loan.

Background