The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas recently clarified the administrative expense standard applicable to indenture trustees by holding that they can recover fees and expenses as administrative expenses only when they make a “substantial contribution.” This standard requires a greater showing than “benefit to the estate,” which is the general administrative expense standard. In re Sanchez Energy Corp., No. 19-34508 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 3, 2021).

Background

Turns out, it depends on who you ask. Judge Bernstein said no. Recently, Judge Glenn said yes, but only for causes of action that resemble actual fraudulent transfers. It is unusual for the bankruptcy judges in Manhattan to disagree with each other, so let’s take a look at the issue.

Background

In a first, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the Arcapita Bank case had to decide whether Shari’a compliant investment agreements, providing for Murabaha and Wakala transactions, qualify for the safe harbor protections provided in the bankruptcy code for securities contracts, forwards and swaps. The court held that they do not. Since the opinion runs about 100 pages long, we attempt to distill some very basic facts concerning Shari’a compliant transactions and point to important holdings made by the court.

Shari’a Compliant Transactions

At the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, provincial emergency orders required the majority of businesses to migrate their workforce to a work-from-home environment. As the pandemic has persisted, what was originally a short-term solution for many businesses, has led many of them to reconsider their current and future need for office space. For those businesses tied into long-term leases, many have turned to subleasing all or a portion of their space as a way to reduce their overhead.

In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a purported debt held by an entity with a near-majority membership interest in the Debtor was actually equity disguised as a loan.

Background

In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit closed the door on triangular setoffs, ruling that the mutuality requirement under Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code must be strictly construed and requires that the debt and claim sought to be setoff must be between the same two parties. In re: Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., No. 20-1136 (3d. Cir. 2021).

Background

In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the election of a tenant, under Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, to remain in possession of real property governed by a rejected lease causes a third-party guaranty on another rejected agreement to remain in effect, to the extent such agreement and the lease are part of an integrated transaction.

A recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals, Sutton v. Pilevsky held that federal bankruptcy law does not preempt state law tortious interference claims against non-debtors who participated in a scheme that caused a debtor—in this case a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity—to breach contractual obligations intended to ensure that the entity remains a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) and to facilitate the lenders’ enforcement of remedies upon a future bankruptcy filing, if any.

A recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals, Sutton v. Pilevsky held that federal bankruptcy law does not preempt state law tortious interference claims against non-debtors who participated in a scheme that caused a debtor—in this case a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity—to breach contractual obligations intended to ensure that the entity remains a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) and to facilitate the lenders’ enforcement of remedies upon a future bankruptcy filing, if any.

The Ontario Court of Appeal (the “Court of Appeal”) released its decision in 7636156 Canada Inc. (Re), 2020 ONCA 681 on October 28, 2020. The Court of Appeal clarified the law regarding a landlord’s entitlement to draw on a letter of credit where the underlying lease has been disclaimed by a trustee. Overturning the lower court decision, the Court of Appeal held the landlord was entitled draw down on the entire principal of the letter of credit pursuant to its terms and the terms of the disclaimed lease between the parties.