Back in the day--say, the last two decades of the twentieth century--we bankruptcy lawyers took it largely on faith that the right structural and contractual provisions purporting to confer bankruptcy-remoteness[1] were enforceable and likely to be successful in preventing an entity from becoming, voluntarily or involuntarily, a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.

A long-running issue concerning the treatment of trademark licenses in bankruptcy has seen a new milestone with the January 12 decision of the First Circuit in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC.[1] The issue was implicit in the Bankruptcy Code from the time of its adoption in 1978 and flared into the open with the decision of the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.

When the fallout from failed intellectual-property litigation collides with bankruptcy, the complexities may be dizzying enough, but when the emerging practices and imperatives of litigation financing are imposed on those complexities, the situation might be likened to three-dimensional chess. But in the court of one veteran bankruptcy judge, the complexities were penetrated to reveal that elementary errors and oversights can have decisive effects.

It is a unique characteristic of debt restructuring under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code that a majority of a class of creditors can accept a modification of the terms of the debts owed to the class members, as provided in a plan of reorganization, and thereby bind non-accepting class members.[1] The ordinary route to confirming a Chapter 11 plan is to obtain its acceptance by a majority of every impaired class of creditors and equity hold

Avoiding a fraudulent transfer to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in bankruptcy has become easier, or at least clearer, as a result of a recent unanimous decision by a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Zazzali v. United States (In re DBSI, Inc.), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16817 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2017).

The long-running litigation spawned by the leveraged buyout of Tribune Company, which closed in December 2007, and the subsequent bankruptcy case commenced on December 8, 2008[1] has challenged the maxim that “there’s nothing new under the sun” even for this writer with four decades of bankruptcy practice behind him.

On May 3, 2017, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico filed a voluntary petition for relief on behalf of Puerto Rico in federal court there. The filing required the Chief Justice of the United States to designate a district court judge to conduct the case. On May 5, Chief Justice Roberts appointed District Judge Laura Taylor Swain of the Southern District of New York. Judge Swain was a bankruptcy judge in the Eastern District of New York before joining the district court in 2000.

Savers who become bankrupt but have not yet drawn their pensions will not have to hand them to creditors after a ruling of the Court of Appeal put an end to fears that pension pots were at risk.

The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s ruling on Horton v Henry, originally heard in 2014, settling legal difficulties arising from a conflicting judgment of Raithatha v Williamson (2012); and the introduction of the pension freedoms.

The senior board members (other than Sir Philip Green) are next to face the committees comprising Lord Grabiner, non-executive chairman of Traveta Investments Limited and Traveta Investments (No 2) Limited; Ian Grabiner, CEO of Arcadia; Paul Budge, FD of Arcadia and former BHS board member; Gillian Hague, group financial controller of Arcadia; and Chris Harris, group property director for Arcadia. This group of individuals (other than Lord Grabiner and Ian Grabiner) together with Sir Philip Green comprised the Traveta board’s sub-group responsible for negotiating the sale of BHS.

The adviser group 2 session on Monday 23 May comprised Owen Clay, corporate lawyer for Arcadia and Traveta (Linklaters); Steve Denison, auditor of Traveta and its subsidiaries, including BHS (PwC); and Anthony Gutman, ‘informal’ adviser to the Arcadia Group (Goldman Sachs).

The questioning focused on the solvency position of BHS at the time of the acquisition, the level of due diligence undertaken on the eventual acquirer (Retail Acquisitions Ltd) and the recognition of the pensions deficit in the deal negotiation.