We have noodled on the impact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Merit Management Group, LP v.
Whether because of, or in spite of, the proliferating case law it is hard to say, but the issues in, underlying and surrounding third-party releases in Chapter 11 plans just continue to arise with incessant regularity, albeit without a marked increase in clarity. We have posted about those issues here six times in little more than two years,[1] and it is fair to assume that this post will not be the last.
In the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“2005 Act”), Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code and Title 28 of the U.S.
A bankruptcy trustee exercising her or his avoidance powers under Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code may seek to recover the avoidably transferred property (or its value) from “the initial transferee,” “the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made” and “any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.”[1] Despite the authorization to seek recovery from multiple sources, “[t]he trustee is entitled to only a sin
Our May 22 post reported on the Supreme Court’s May 20 decision in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v.
It always amazes me when, after more than a half-century of Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) jurisprudence, an issue one thinks would arise quite commonly appears never to have been decided in a reported case. Such an issue was recently decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in an adversary proceeding in the Pettit Oil Co. Chapter 7 case.[1]
Can another vain attempt to mitigate a $1.5 billion mistake provide the occasion for a thorough review of the doctrine of earmarking? It did for Southern District Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn in the long tail on the General Motors bankruptcy case.
In the recent decision of Re M.D.Y. Construction Ltd [2018] IEHC 676 the Examiner sought to have proposals for a scheme of arrangement confirmed by the High Court pursuant to section 541 of the Companies Act 2014 (the "Act"). The most interesting feature of the case was that the scheme of arrangement was proposed for approval by the Interim Examiner before his appointment was confirmed by the High Court.
Arrangement to be approved the day after application to confirm appointment