Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

在 Sian Participation v. Halimeda International [2024] UKPC 16一案中，布里格斯勋爵（Lord Briggs）和夏宝伦勋爵（Lord Hamblen）代表委员会作出判决，认可了关于清盘呈请的传统做法。两位法官确认，即使产生债务的合同包含仲裁条款，亦不能削弱债务人证明债务确实存在实质性争议的责任（下称“可审理问题标准”）。

该案中，委员会的观点与香港高等法院暂委法官王鸣峰资深大律师（William Wong SC）在 Dayang v. Asia Master Logistics [2020] 2 HKLRD 423 一案中的观点（见判词第82、98段）如出一辙，可归纳如下：

In Sian Participation v. Halimeda International [2024] UKPC 16, Lords Briggs and Hamblen, delivering judgment on behalf of the Board, endorsed the traditional approach to winding-up petitions. Their Lordships confirmed that a debtor’s duty to show that the debt is genuinely disputed on substantial grounds (“Triable Issue Standard”) remains undiluted even if the contract from which the debt arose contains an arbitration clause.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.

Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”^[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,^[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by