Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

One of the main advantages for a debtor to seek protection under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) or the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) is the stay of proceedings that prevents creditors faced with a default in payment from taking any action against the debtor. This allows the debtor, among other things, to reorganize itself or dispose of some or all of its assets under the court’s supervision. Be that as it may, there are exceptions.

L’un des principaux avantages pour un débiteur de se placer sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (« LACC ») ou de la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité (« LFI ») consiste en la suspension des procédures pouvant être intentées par un créancier faisant face à un défaut de paiement. Cette suspension des procédures permet notamment à la débitrice de se réorganiser ou de disposer de certains ou de l’ensemble de ses actifs sous la supervision du tribunal. Or, certaines exceptions existent.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

On July 20, 2020, the Quebec Court of Appeal (Court of Appeal) released its decision in Séquestre de Media5 Corporation, overturning the lower court’s decision and authorizing the appointment of a receiver pursuant to section 243(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.