There have been many reported cases in the bankruptcies of Mr and Mrs Brake (the “Brakes”) including the recent case of Patley Wood Farm LLP v Kicks [2023] EWCA Civ 901 where the Court of Appeal considered an application under s303 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “IA 1986”) against a decision of the trustees in bankruptcy of the Brakes (the “Trustees”).

The Supreme Court’s judgment in BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA and ors^[1] (“Sequana”) is a key decision on the law surrounding directors’ duties.

The High Court was required to consider the Supreme Court’s Sequana judgment in Hunt v Singh (below).

What did we learn from Sequana?

In the recent case of Brake & Anor v Chedington Court Estate Limited [2023] UKSC 29, the Supreme Court has clarified the categories of persons who have standing to make a challenge to the conduct of a trustee in bankruptcy under s303 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “Act”). The Supreme Court confirmed that its decision will also apply to creditors and others seeking to challenge the actions of a liquidator under s168(5) of the Act. The decision will be welcomed by practitioners.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.

Our February 26 post entitled “SBRA Springs to Life”^[1] reported on the first case known to me that dealt with the issue whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case should be permitted to amend its petition to designate it as a case under Subchapter V,^[2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by

State governments can be creditors of individuals, businesses and institutions that are debtors in bankruptcy in a variety of ways, most notably as tax and fine collectors but also as lenders. They can also be debtors of debtors, in their role, for example, as the purchasers of vast quantities of goods and services on credit. And they can also be transferees of a debtor’s property in (at least) every role in which they can be creditors.